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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
Does Privatization Matter? An Exploration of Foster Care Permanency Outcomes 
by 
Allison Dunnigan 
Doctor of Philosophy in Social Work 
Brown School of Social Work 
Washington University in St. Louis, 2018 
Professor Melissa Jonson-Reid, Chair 
In the United States, at any given time, there are nearly 400,000 children in foster care due to 
maltreatment or for reasons such as parental incarceration, parental death or voluntary 
relinquishment. Youth in out of home care are a small proportion of all children served by the 
child welfare system, but they comprise the majority of the system costs and are at high risk for 
poor outcomes across a number of domains. Concerns regarding both cost and poor outcomes 
began a trend toward privatization of child welfare in the mid-1990s. Despite the long history, 
there has been very little evaluation of outcomes outside of assessing cost savings.  This 
dissertation used data from the Adoption and Foster Care Analysis and Reporting System 
(AFCARS) supplemented with policy information available through the Child Welfare Gateway 
and state websites to assess whether youth permanency outcomes (length of stay, type of exit 
from care and re-entry into care) varied according to privatization of services. Results indicate 
that overall youth served by privatized systems stay longer in care and are somewhat less likely 
to have a positive exit (return home, adoption or permanent residence with relative). On the other 
hand, among those who did exit care, youth served in privatized systems were less likely to 
return to care. Implications for continued research, policy and program planning are discussed.
 1 
Chapter 1: Background and Introduction 
At any given time, there are nearly 400,000 children in foster care in the United States 
(US DHHS, 2017a). While such youth represent a small proportion of the population of youth 
served by the child welfare system, they comprise much of the system costs and are at risk for a 
number of poor outcomes. Youth in foster care are at increased risk for negative outcomes 
including academic performance, mental illness, chronic physical health concerns, rule-breaking 
behavior, and homelessness (Jaudes, et al., 2012; Jonson-Reid, Dunnigan & Ryan, 2018; 
Romano, Babchishin, Marquis & Frechette, 2015; Simms, Dubowitz, & Szilagyi, 2000). In 
addition to the negative outcomes associated with a history of child welfare involvement, the 
economic burden for one child involved in the child welfare system is $73,094 and the 
nationwide estimates are over 29 billion dollars for the direct costs associated with the child 
welfare system (Gelles & Perlman, 2012). Daro (1988) estimated that long term foster care costs 
nearly $646 million which, based on inflation, is 1.3 billion in 2015 dollars. 
1.1 Statement of the Problem 
The total economic burden associated with children in foster care is great when 
considering the costs of mental health treatment, law enforcement, and acute medical treatment 
(Gelles & Perlman, 2012). Additionally, there have been a number of concerns regarding how 
long youth remain in care and the likelihood of exiting to a permanent and stable home as it is 
generally believed that the more quickly a youth can achieve permanence the better their chances 
of attaining positive developmental outcomes (Becker, Jordan & Larsen, 2007). To this end, 
there have been a variety of federal policy changes since 1990 designed to impact these altering 
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timelines, prioritizing kinship placements and incentivizing adoptions (Akin, 2011; Adoption and 
Safe Families Act of 1997). The high costs of serving children in foster care and ongoing 
concerns about outcomes coupled with changing political ideologies, resulted in a move toward 
privatizing child welfare systems across the U.S. beginning in the 1990s. Proponents of 
privatization believe that innovation and cost-savings can only be realized if the government is 
no longer providing services (Morgan and England, 1988). Critics of privatization in child 
welfare point to difficulties in implementation in a non-consumer based system and worries that 
achieving contractual outcomes will be prioritized over child well-being (McBeath & Meezan, 
2009).  
While some research has been done on cost savings associated with privatization, child 
level outcomes associated with the move away from the delivery of child welfare services from a 
public bureaucracy to a private or collaborative system has rarely been explored (McBeath et al, 
2014; Menozzi, 2016). Indeed, the impact structural factors generally on child outcomes for 
children involved in child welfare is a field of study that is under-researched. Structural factors 
relevant to the child welfare system include state-level (governance, definition of maltreatment, 
funding streams), jurisdictional level (judicial philosophy and interpretation of policies and 
procedures, workforce training and education), and organizational level factors (privatization). In 
contrast to the attention paid to the individual organizational factors such as climate and culture, 
less attention has been paid to structural factors that operate at the state and jurisdictional levels 
(Glisson, Dukes, & Green, 2006; Glisson & Green, 2011; Aarons & Sawitzky, 2006). 
Thus, despite nearly 20 years of implementation, we know almost nothing about how 
privatization and the subsequent variations in implementation and interpretation of policies and 
workforce factors impact placement, permanency, and child well-being measures. This 
3 
 
dissertation helps to fill this gap by exploring the relationship between privatization of foster care 
case management and permanency outcomes for youth in foster care. 
1.2 History of Foster Care Policy 
  There are two key national components essential to understanding the political landscape 
that guides child welfare service delivery: federal child welfare policies and the New Federalism 
movement of the late twentieth century. Federal policies broadly define what services can and 
should be provided to children reported for maltreatment while the political ideology of New 
Federalism helps explain the variations in child welfare services across states as well as the 
political discourse regarding public goods and services. The first half of this chapter provides an 
overview of the key federal child welfare policies, starting with the Social Security Act of 1935 
and reviewing the comprehensive child welfare laws of the 20th century and the revisions or 
clarifications of the early 2000’s.  The second half of this chapter will explore the evolution and 
resurgence of New Federalism and how this relates to child welfare service delivery. 
Prior to the establishment of the U.S. Children’s Bureau in 1912 (one of the key 
outcomes of the 1909 Conference on Children), services for indigent, neglected, and incorrigible 
youth were provided through a mostly unconnected network of charity and religious 
organizations. The case of Mary Ellen Wilson in 1874 is often cited as the impetus behind the 
establishment of federal child protection legislation (Richett and Hudson, 1979; Nelson, 1995; 
Jimenez, 1990). The case was made famous due to the authorities being reluctant to act until the 
intercession of Elbridge Thomas Gerry with the American Society for the Prevention of Animals. 
Mary Ellen Wilson was removed from the home and testified to the routine and severe physical 
abuse she experienced at the hands of her foster parents. This case is cited as a main reason 
behind the creation of the New York Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children 
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(NYSPCC) (Children’s Bureau, n.d.). At the end of the 19th century, the NYSPCC was central to 
efforts establish and enforce legislation that protects children from abuse, neglect, and 
exploitation. This is the environment that led to the 1909 Conference on Children and subsequent 
federal legislation.  
With the formalization of the Children’s Bureau and the determination of the 1909 
conference that children should be placed in home environments such as foster care, there were 
clear mandates for what services for maltreated children should look like but there was no 
mechanism for implementation nationwide. Following the 1909 Conference, 20 states passed 
legislation that provided financial assistance to mothers of children that would previously have 
been removed from the home and placed in almshouses or sent to rural communities on the 
Orphan Trains (Bremner, 1971). The role of the Children’s Bureau, per se, was limited until the 
Social Security Act of 1935 (SSA) when the protection and of at risk children became the 
mandated purview of the Children’s Bureau. With the passage of the SSA, additional funding 
mechanisms were established to support children and families in need. The Titles IV-B and IV-E 
of the SSA are the primary funding sources for state child welfare services. This act also 
established the Aid for Dependent Children program, which provides financial assistance to 
children. The SSA provided for services under a broad definition of child welfare, including 
poverty and general well-being. Subsequent policies were implemented specifically for the 
protection of children from maltreatment and the delivery of associated services.  
It was not until the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act of 1974 (CAPTA) that 
there was a federal definition of maltreatment (CAPTA, 1974). Maltreatment is broadly defined 
as abuse and/or neglect as evidenced by acts of commission or omission. In fact, there is 
significant variation in what constitutes maltreatment across, and within, state child welfare 
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systems and across various studies. Most children and youth enter foster care following an 
official report of maltreatment, although there are other reasons for entry such as parental death 
or incarceration or voluntary relinquishment (U.S. DHHS, 2017).  
Following CAPTA, it took almost another decade before the Child Welfare Act of 1980 
(also known as the Adoptions Assistance Act of 1980) overhauled the mandated services 
provided to maltreated children and their families and instituted a system of incentives aimed at 
decreasing the number of children in foster care (AACWA, 1980). Understanding the inherent 
differences and even conflicts between these two pieces of federal legislation is necessary to 
fully understand that nature of service delivery within the child welfare system today.  
CAPTA not only established a federal definition of maltreatment but established a 
national clearinghouse for research, information dissemination, provision of technical assistance 
and allocation of federal funds, and tied state funding to the passage of mandated reporter 
legislation (CAPTA). This funding has been identified as a causal factor in the increase of foster 
care placements following the passage of CAPTA (Gibson & Lewis, 1980). Governmental 
hearings on child abuse, held following the implementation of CAPTA, referred to a dramatic 
increase in child abuse reports that overwhelmed the state child welfare systems (U.S. House 
Hearings, 1981). These hearings, held in 1977 and 1980 included testimony from social workers, 
medical professionals, and various child welfare professionals. One Massachusetts child welfare 
system official stated that there was a 700% increase in the number of child abuse reports since 
CAPTA (U.S. House Hearings, 1977). This increase in reports is not solely the function of 
incentives put in place by CAPTA but also due to the increased public awareness, passage of 
mandated reporting laws, and other infrastructure mechanisms established by CAPTA.  
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The increased public awareness that accompanied mandated reporting laws as well as the 
onset of the federal policies may explain the steep rise in the number of reports of child abuse 
and the associated increase of children in foster care (Jimenez, 1990). In 1983 the month of April 
was designated National Child Abuse Prevention Month and the Office on Child Abuse and 
Neglect (OCAN) coordinates both activities and the dissemination of statistics and information 
(Children’s Bureau, n.d.).  
The Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980 (AACWA) can be viewed as a 
response to the rise in child abuse reports and subsequent foster care placements and the 
concerns associated with “foster care drift” (Antler & Antler, 1978). Where CAPTA promotes 
and supports the role of the professional child welfare worker as a protector of children, 
AACWA aims to protect the family from the intrusion of the child welfare system and policies 
(Jimenez, 1990). Specifically, AACWA was aimed at both increasing the number of children 
adopted out of foster care and preventing the removal of children from their families of origin 
(AACWA, 1980). 
 Subsequent federal policies further clarified both the incentive system established in 
CAPTA and specified requirements for the provision of services to special populations. This 
includes the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA) and the Multiethnic Placement Act of 
1994 (MEPA). ICWA provides protections for American Indian tribes and children who are 
served within the child welfare system. Specifically, ICWA provides tribes with preference in 
placement for children identified as an “Indian child” under the purview of the child welfare 
system. MEPA was passed in response to the bias against transracial foster placement and 
adoption that resulted in minority children, primarily African-American, remaining in foster care 
for extended periods of time. MEPA was revised in 1996 to clarify the language. The revisions in 
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1996 were passed following intense criticism that the original wording allowed for 
discrimination with regards to children in care, the recruitment of potential foster/adoptive 
families, or communities. Specifically, the term “solely” was removed with the 1996 amendment 
from the law. Advocates of the revision argued that by stating that placement and adoption 
decisions could not be made “solely on the basis of the race, color, or national origin” of 
individuals allowed for such considerations to be included in the placement decision, in effect 
sanctioning some form of discrimination in the placement and adoption of children (Downs, 
Moore & McFadden, 2009). The issue of trans-racial placement and adoption continues to spark 
debate within the child welfare system, but no additional legislation has addressed this issue 
since the revisions of MEPA in 1996. 
Despite the efforts of AACWA to stem the increase in children in the child welfare 
system, the numbers continued to rise through the 1980s and 1990s. Murray (2007) found that 
between 1986 and 1995 the number of children in foster care increased from 280,000 to almost 
500,000. This is the byproduct of a number of societal and systemic factors including the 
prevalent crack-cocaine usage, mandatory drug sentencing, and the HIV/AIDS epidemic 
(Downs, Moore, and McFadden, 2009). Of further concern was the over-representation of 
African-American youths within the child welfare system, a by-product of the over-
representation of African-Americans within the criminal justice system and the prevalence of 
poverty (Phillips & Mann, 2013).  
Once again, the federal government sought to decrease the number of children in foster 
care and improve permanency outcomes through the passage of federal policy, the Adoption and 
Safe Families Act of 1997 (ASFA). ASFA was designed and passed with the hopes that it would 
decrease the length of time children spent in foster care as well as decreasing the number of 
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children in foster care. These goals were to be achieved through the implementation and 
enforcement of performance standards tied to financial penalties when states failed to show 
improvement in both child wellbeing and permanency. Reunification and family preservation 
services were encouraged, as was adoption of children in foster care. This was achieved through 
financial incentives awarded to states for the adoption of children out of foster care, instituting 
permanency timelines that required filing a petition to terminate parental rights if a child has 
been in an out-of-home placement for 15 of the last 22 months, and financial support for 
minority foster and adoptive family recruitment.  
Since its inception, ASFA has been modified twice. In 2001 amendments were passed to 
strengthen family preservation and reunification efforts following concern that states were 
focusing efforts on adoption due to the financial incentives. Additional amendments in 2001 
targeted adoption for older and minority youth who were spending long periods of time in foster 
care. In 2008 the Fostering Connections to Success and Increasing Adoptions Act was passed to 
increase adoptions and guardianships for older youth who would otherwise remain in foster care 
until reaching the age of majority. This Act also provided federal funding for states to provide 
transitional programs for youth until the age of 21. 
1.3 The Move to Privatization 
 The federal policies reviewed represent the governmental response to the needs of 
maltreated children over time. Of course, such policies, including privatization, are influenced by 
the overall political environment. One of the most influential aspects of American political 
ideology related to the argument for privatizing child welfare services is federalism (Gerston, 
2007; LaCroix, 2010). A review of the key tenets of this ideology as well as the opposing 
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ideologies illustrates key factors that led to the passage of the child welfare policies reviewed 
above as well as the interest in privatization. 
1.3.1 New Federalism  
Federalism at its core is a division of power between a central government and smaller, 
local governments (Gerston, 2007). Federalism has different meaning in different countries. For 
example, local government may be provinces as in Canada or states in the US. In the European 
context of the term, Federalism refers generally to a strong central government. This was also the 
case in the United States until the last twenty years of the 20th century with the evolving 
interpretation, ultimately identified as New Federalism (Gerston, 2007, LaCroix, 2010). The 
strong foundation of Federalism within the US has contributed to the argument in favor of states’ 
rights to protect against the infringement from the federal government.  
 New Federalism is a modern interpretation of Federalism, a political concept that can be 
traced throughout Europe, south Asia, the pacific, and the United States.  New Federalism, at its 
most basic level, is the political ideology that the federal government should transfer powers to 
local and state governments (Gerston, 2007). New Federalism has come to mean a belief that 
services, and governmental responsibilities are more efficiently provided by state governments in 
comparison to the federal government. 
 New Federalism traces its founding to student groups at 3 law schools (Yale, Harvard, 
and University of Chicago) in 1982 over what was perceived to be the overwhelming liberal bias 
within law schools. This student group evolved into The Federalist Society with chapters in over 
200 US law schools and counts over 40,000 members. The Federalist Society claims five current 
or former Supreme Court justices as members (Scalia, Roberts, Alito, Thomas, and Gorsuch) and 
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plays an active role in advocacy and promoting debate on a number of issues related to judicial 
appointments and the US legal system (Federalist Society, n.d.).  
 The formation of the Federalist Society and the rise of New Federalism came into 
prominence at the same time as President Reagan’s “devolution revolution” (Downs, Costin, and 
McFadden, 1996). Under President Reagan’s administration there were increased efforts to 
transfer federal government powers to the states to implement as they saw fit. These efforts 
resulted in the wide implementation of block grants from the federal government to states for the 
resolution of social issues (Crum, 1998; Freeman, 2003; Freundlich & Gerstenzang, 2003). 
Kmiec and Diamond (1984, p. 324) expressed concern as to whether local governments were any 
improvement in the efficient delivery of services, advocating for the privatization “of all 
municipal services, except those which are related to the production of public goods, rigorously 
defined.” While devolution does not necessitate privatization, it opened the door for private 
agencies to lobby state governments to establish a mechanism for competition with state 
agencies for the delivery of public goods.  
 The statements of Kmiec and Diamond (1984) proved prescient with the quick rise in 
privatization of municipal services including child support enforcement, healthcare, food stamps, 
welfare benefits and as discussed in Chapter 2, child welfare services.  Although privatization is 
not mandated by federal policy, it has been seen nonetheless as both a means to decrease costs 
and obtain the permanency and stability outcomes that are mandated by federal policy (McBeath 
& Meezan, 2008; Menozzi, 2016). Indeed, the contracts that are developed between government 
and private agencies highlight the need for private agencies to achieve the metrics that are part of 
the federal Children and Youth Services Review process for all states.  
1.4 Stability and Permanency Outcomes 
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Despite these reforms, permanency and stability remain a major focus of policy and 
program efforts. Stability may refer to both the number of moves during a period in care (usually 
called a spell) or, once exited from care, remaining safe and not re-entering foster care. While 
almost no research exits regarding the influence of privatization, research does exit regarding 
predictors of length of stay or exits from care. These serve as important controls for explorations 
of policy impact. 
The number of discrete placements a youth resides in is of particular interest as an 
increase in placements is associated with negative outcomes including mental and physical 
health diagnoses, lower academic achievement, delinquency, and longer periods of time in foster 
care (Dunnigan, Thompson, Jonson-Reid, & Drake, 2017; Jonson-Reid, 2002; Lee, Jonson-Reid 
& Drake, 2012; Pecora et al, 2005; Bruskas, 2008; Lee & Jonson-Reid, 2009; Ryan, 2012). 
Placement instability has also been found to be associated with lower likelihood of a positive exit 
(i.e., reunification, adoption or guardianship) (Akin, 2011).  At least one study found that exit 
types varied in likelihood over time, with reunification generally occurring rapidly while the 
likelihood of adoption increased dramatically over 12 months (Connell, Katz, Saunders & Tebes, 
2006). 
The type of placement is also key in many studies of foster care permanency.  In 
particular, residential or group homes are associated with increased risk of negative outcomes 
including lower academic achievement, longer time in care, mental health diagnoses, and 
homelessness (Ryan & Testa, 2005; Williams et al, 2010; Ryan, Hong, Herz, & Hernandez, 
2010; Ryan, Marshall, Herz, & Hernandez, 2008). It is important to note that certain placement 
types (e.g. residential facilities, transitional living programs, and group homes) are associated 
with older youth in care who are also more likely to have been in foster care for longer periods of 
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time and experience a greater number of placement disruptions (Ryan and Testa, 2005). 
Placement with kin (or relative care) is sometimes associated with longer stays in care (e.g., 
Winokur, Crawford, Longobard & Valentine, 2008), but is also cited as facilitating placement 
stability and permanency (Akin, 2011; O-Brien, 2012;). Both placement stability (number of 
placements) and type are control variables in the present study. 
Permanency within the context of child welfare refers to an exit from the foster care 
system. Generally, desirable exits are reunification with the family of origin, adoption, or 
guardianship (Child Welfare Information Gateway, ND). Further, types of permanency are often 
considered to be tiered with adoption and reunification identified as the preferred permanency 
outcomes with guardianship next. Youth who exit out of foster care by reaching the age of 
majority are included in foster care statistics as “aging-out” youth and are not considered to have 
achieved permanency. Youth who exit due to running away, transfer to other agencies (e.g., 
incarcerated) or death are also not counted as achieving permanency goals.  On the other hand, 
studies vary in their categorization of what is a positive exit from care.  Some studies focus on 
reunification, adoption or guardianship (Akin, 2011; Courtney & Hook, 2012) while others also 
include transfers to other programs, informal placement with kin or emancipation from care as a 
successful exit (Becker et al., 2007). 
A variety of factors have been associated with permanency in the research including child 
demographics, placement types and moves and jurisdiction variation (Becker et al., 2007; 
Courtney & Hook, 2012). Perhaps the most dominant focus on disparities in timely and positive 
exits has been related to race—most typically African American children compared to others 
(Courtney, 2012).  The relationship of race to length of stay and exit to care has been mixed.  For 
example, Courtney and Hook (2012) found that African American children were slightly less 
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likely to be reunified (about 9%) but there were no differences in likelihood of guardianship or 
adoption. Akin (2011) found that race did not predict reunification or guardianship, but African 
American children were less likely to be adopted than White children. Becker and colleagues 
(2007) found that white children compared to all non-white children were about 35% more likely 
to have a “successful” exit as defined earlier.   
Other factors include age, child developmental difficulties, material needs, and removal 
reason. There is variation in findings between studies that may be indicative of state and regional 
differences. In Courtney & Hook (2012) children under the age of 5 were less likely to return 
home or enter guardianship and more likely to be adopted than school-age children. Older 
children were more likely to exit to guardianship. In contrast Akin (2011) found that all children 
over the age of 2 were more likely to be reunified and enter guardianship compared to infants, 
but reported similar results for infants being more likely to exit to adoption. Becker and 
colleagues (2007) found that children with a developmental disability or mental health disorder 
were less likely to have a successful exit. In Akin (2011) children with disabilities were less 
likely to exit to reunification and guardianship, but more likely to be adopted. In the same study, 
children who were removed for physical abuse were more likely to be reunified than children 
removed for neglect. Courtney & Hook (2012) found that child disability was similarly 
associated with a decreased likelihood with reunification but found an increased likelihood of 
guardianship and no association with adoption. Both Akin (2011) and Courtney & Hook (2012) 
found mixed associations with exit type and known mental health disorder. In Courtney & Hook 
(2012), neglect reduced the likelihood of reunification but increased the likelihood of 
guardianship and adoption. Becker and colleagues (2007) did not control for entry reason. 
Fowler and colleagues (2013) found the material issues such as barriers to housing impact impact 
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the likelihood of placement but it is unclear how such issues may impact subsequent 
reunification.   Akin’s (2011) study used data from a Midwestern state, Becker and colleagues 
(2007) used Florida data, and Courtney and Hook (2012) used data from Washington state. 
Becker and colleagues (2007) and Courtney and Hook (2012) also reported significant variation 
by jurisdictions within states (Florida and Washington respectively).  
Another form of stability refers to remaining in a positive permanent home rather than re-
entering care.  While not uncommon, rates of re-entry vary widely by state, length of follow-up 
and the type of exit from care (Courtney, Piliavin & Wright, 1997; Shaw, 2006; Wulcyzn, 2004; 
Lee, Jonson-Reid & Drake, 2012).  Similar to placement instability while in care, multiple re-
entries into care are associated with poor outcomes (Cutuli et al., 2016; Jonson-Reid & Barth, 
2003; Rubin et al., 2004). States that fail to meet standards for rates of re-entry may also face 
federal sanctions-particularly if re-entry occurs following reunification (Carnochan, Rizik-Baer 
& Austin, 2013; Kimberlin, Anthony & Austin, 2009).  
While studies have identified a number of risk and protective factors including 
demographics, child health and behavior, caregiver risk factors and poverty (Kimberlin et al., 
2009), findings for many factors are mixed.  For example, several studies have found that very 
young or teenage youth or African American children are more likely to re-enter (Kimberlin et 
al., 2009).  In contrast, Lee and colleagues (2012) found no differences in the likelihood of re-
entry following reunification by child demographics, controlling for family poverty and 
caregiver risk factors. Children who stayed in care for 8-18 months compared to shorter stays 
were more likely to re-enter care.  Other studies have found that children with shorter stays in 
care were more at risk of re-entry (Shaw, 2006; Wulczyn, 2004).  Early studies found that child 
disability and behavioral problems predicted re-entry (e.g., Courtney et al., 1997).  Barth and 
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colleagues (2008) also found that children with emotional or behavioral difficulties were more 
likely to re-enter care following reunification although the study was restricted to elementary 
school aged children. 
1.5 Costs of Foster Care 
 In addition to concerns about outcomes for youth in care, concerns have also arisen 
around the costs of foster care. In addition to the negative outcomes associated with a history of 
child welfare involvement, the economic burden for one child involved in the child welfare 
system is $73,094 and the nationwide estimates are over 29 billion dollars for the direct costs 
associated with the child welfare system (Gelles & Perlman, 2012). Children who stay longer in 
care or re-enter care multiple times are even more costly (Kimberlin et al., 2009). The dual 
concerns about the continued problems attaining desired outcomes and the costs underlie most of 
the movement toward privatization of child welfare. Since the late 1990’s the child welfare 
systems of most states have established some privatization initiative (Crum, 1998). While states 
have privatized both in-home and foster care services, the dominant focus has been on foster care 
(Flaherty, Collins-Camargo & Lee, 2008). Yet despite the long history, little is known about 
whether this particular reform has resulted in better outcomes for youth in foster care. This 
dissertation will help to fill some of this gap in knowledge. 
1.6 Scope of Study 
In this study, youth in the foster care system will consist of any child placed under the 
legal or physical jurisdiction of the court due to maltreatment. This may include youth who are 
also receiving services through the court due to delinquent or status offenses, for example 14% 
of youth in foster care in Nebraska have also committed a delinquent act and are under dual 
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jurisdiction with the court for that reason (Nebraska Department of Health and Human Services, 
2009). For all youth, including those with dual jurisdiction, placement in foster care is the direct 
result of a determination that a youth was a victim of maltreatment that necessitates removal 
from the family of origin.   
There are programs and services that provide out-of-home placement on a voluntary, 
non-formal basis; however, these are youth placed in foster care voluntarily by their legal 
guardian. There are fundamental differences between youth placed on a voluntary basis in 
comparison to youth placed in foster care involuntarily, however all children served by the foster 
care system are subject to the same policies, services, organizational factors that are of interest in 
this research.  Attempts were made to identify the sub-populations of youth that were under the 
jurisdiction of both the juvenile justice and the foster care system in Nebraska as they may differ 
than other youth in foster care.  However, attempts to identify these youths were unsuccessful 
through use of exit, placement, and removal reason variables as coded in AFCARS. 
Consequently, any youth that is placed in foster care, regardless of whether it is voluntary or 
involuntary, dually involved or solely under the jurisdiction of the foster care system, are 
considered to be part of the population of interest. Reason for placement, however, is controlled. 
This study examines the likelihood of achieving permanency outcomes under privatized 
as compared to public agency systems. Two separate analyses were conducted: (1) a comparison 
of permanency outcomes (both initial exit and likelihood of re-entry) between similar states that 
differ by privatization; and (2) a pre-post comparison design between two states with one 
maintaining a public system while the other changed to a private system and then changed back 
to a public system.  
1.7 Research Aims  
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Aim 1: Do youth receiving private foster care case management experience differential 
permanency and stability outcomes (no re-entry into care after exit) when compared to youth 
receiving public foster care case management? 
H1:  Youth served by privatized foster care case managers differ from youth served by 
public foster care case managers in time to exit 
H2:  Youth served by privatized foster care case managers differ from youth served by 
public foster care case manager in re-entry to foster care 
H3: Youth served by privatized foster care case managers differ from youth served by 
public foster care case managers in type of exit from foster care 
H4:  These differences vary by county 
H5:  These differences vary by state 
Aim 2: Explore how privatization (and de-privatization) of foster care case management services 
impact permanency outcomes for youth in foster care 
Q1:  Are there changes in the trajectory of permanency outcomes following a shift 
from public to private foster care case management? 
Q2:  Are there changes in the trajectory of permanency outcomes following a shift 
from private to public foster care case management? 
Hypotheses are not offered for AIM 2 given there is insufficient research on the impact of 
changes in and out of privatization. 
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Chapter 2: Theory Underlying Privatization 
and Empirical Findings 
This chapter explores the economic principles that inform the state-led efforts to privatize 
child welfare services and are used to evaluate the success of these initiatives. One of the 
primary economic principles of interest is public goods, and more specifically quasi-public 
goods, with the associated concepts of altruism and the “warm glow” model. Another key 
concept is that of market forces, including competition. A review of three statewide privatization 
initiatives will illustrate how these concepts manifest in the privatization of child welfare 
services. 
2.1 Child Welfare as a Public Good 
 Samuelson (1954) identifies public goods as those where “one man’s consumption does 
not reduce some other man’s consumption”. It must contain both the characteristic of 
nonexcludability as well as jointness in consumption (Holcombe, 1997). Nonexcludability relates 
to open access for non-paying customers. Public goods also have the tendency of inefficient 
provision by private arrangements (Oakland, 1987). Efficiency within the field of economics has 
to do with the equality between the value of the good produced and the opportunity cost or the 
value of goods not produced. Value is determined differently between private and public goods 
due to the nonexcludability nature of public goods. Child welfare services are a quasi-public 
good, in that there are limits or exclusionary factors as to who can consume the good and, with 
the onset of privatization, there is competition in service delivery. The affiliated services that are 
part of the greater child welfare system such as mental health, parenting, and other supportive 
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services that families involved in the child welfare system utilize also constitute a quasi-public 
good.  
The level of exclusionary factors varies by the service decision-making point in child 
welfare. All youth who are alleged to be maltreated according to state policies are federally 
mandated to receive an assessment or an investigation provided by the governing child welfare 
system in a particular jurisdiction (US DHHS, 2017). However, youth and/or families are only 
able to access child welfare services following a report based on eligibility which is determined 
by the child welfare system workers. While there is no numerical limit to the number of children 
that can be served, history has demonstrated that as the number of children and families served 
by the child welfare system increases, policy and practice shifts are enacted to decrease the 
burden on the system (Antler & Antler, 1978; Jimenez, 1990). Approximately 1.3 million 
children (roughly 38%) received some sort of service following a report in 2015 (US DHHS, 
2017). 
While the child welfare system is a quasi-public good, it is still subject to the free-rider 
problem, one of the dominant problems associated with the theory of public goods (Samuelson, 
1954). At its most basic level, the free-rider problem occurs when individuals access services 
that they do not pay for, leading to the possibility of service over-use. When a public good is 
provided by the private sector, there is a need to overcome the free-rider problem to ensure 
sustainability. The expansion of privatized child welfare services indicates a belief that the free-
rider problem would be over-powered by a combination of three factors: altruism, the “warm 
glow” model, and individual differences.  
Altruism is the belief that individuals take into consideration the common benefits when 
making choices (Gruber & Wise, 2005; Bergstrom et al, 1988). Based on this belief, a privatized 
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child welfare system will be supported by the general population and their belief in the common 
good over the personal cost. This belief hinges on an informed, resourced, and motivated public 
that trusts the privatized model to provide the delineated services. One factor that is thought to 
engage the public and increase motivation to support a privatized model is the warm glow model 
(Andreoni, 1988, 1989). This model posits that individuals feel good when they give support to a 
particular public good. This can manifest through recognition such as the receipt of awards and 
accolades or be a direct result of individual motivations and beliefs. More generally speaking, an 
individual with beliefs and motivations that align with a public good actually view the good as a 
private good and are willing to contribute more than they would otherwise. Both altruism and the 
warm glow model are inherently individual factors. Accordingly, heterogeneity, or differences 
between individuals, is key to how public goods are viewed and subsequently compensated. An 
individual with a positive personal connection to the child welfare system would therefore be 
likely to contribute more when compared to an individual with no personal connection or a 
negative opinion of the child welfare system.  
Altruism, the “warm glow” model, and the import of individual differences are evident in 
both the arguments for privatizing the child welfare system and in the fundraising efforts that are 
used to sustain private child welfare entities. While advocates of privatization do not overtly 
state the justification for fundraising that the free-rider problem will be overcome, private 
agencies certainly rely on charitable donations. The motivations for these donations is outside the 
scope of this study as the focus of this dissertation is on the shift of public funds to private 
organizations. 
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2.2 Market Forces 
One of the more common arguments for a privatized market is that the government is 
inefficient at service delivery. Greater efficiency means that a privatized system would better 
serve the needs of youth and families. Another argument in support of a privatized system is that 
market forces and competition will improve service delivery and consequently result in cost-
savings. These arguments are an indirect reference to the political ideology of New Federalism, 
which came into prominence at the same time as President Reagan’s “devolution revolution” 
(Downs, 1996). Under President Reagan’s administration there were increased efforts to transfer 
federal government powers to the states to implement programs as they saw fit. These efforts 
resulted in the wide implementation of block grants from the federal government to states. While 
this so-called “devolution” does not necessitate privatization, it opened the door for private 
agencies to lobby state governments to establish a mechanism for competition with state 
agencies for the delivery of public goods. Flaherty, Collins-Camargo, and Lee (2008) credit 
political ideology as one catalyzing reason for the increase in child welfare privatization efforts 
across states. 
The idea of competition for delivery of public goods connotes not only a prioritization of 
efficiency but of cost-saving measures as well. These are the cornerstone arguments behind the 
move to privatize not just child welfare services, but all public goods (Blackstone & Hakim, 
2003). The economic concept of competitive market equilibrium is where the supply equals the 
demand. As discussed earlier, the free-rider problem accounts for the market failure that occurs 
when public goods are under-provided, or overused. In the era of devolution during and 
following the Reagan administration, advocates for a privatized market successfully argued that 
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competition would yield improved services and cost-savings for the over-burdened public child 
welfare system.  
Proponents of the privatization of child welfare have argued for the reliance on the free 
market force of competition for the delivery of foster care case management, adoption services, 
and family preservation services (McCullough and Schmitt, 2000, Blackstone, Buck & Hakim, 
2004; Donner, 1985).  
Proponents of the privatization of child welfare have argued for the reliance on the free 
market force of competition for the delivery of foster care case management, adoption services, 
and family preservation services (McCullough and Schmitt, 2000, Blackstone, Buck & Hakim, 
2004; Donner, 1985). Critics of the approach also point out that there may be a disincentive to 
focus on the child’s best interest in order to meet specific targets written into contracts for private 
agencies (McBeath & Meezan, 2009). 
As an illustration of how a market approach might discount potential negative outcomes, 
let’s consider a more radical argument made by Blackstone and Hakim (2003), that that an 
“auction model” should be implemented for adoption (Blackstone, Buck, & Hakim, 2004). In the 
auction model, the adoption of children with disabilities and less preferred characteristics 
(different race from the adoptive family and family of origin characteristics) will be subsidized 
by the adoption of children who are “preferred”. (Blackstone, Buck, & Hakim, 2004). In this 
model, a more “preferred” child would garner a higher “bid” from potential adoptive parents, 
allowing the funds to off-set the lower “bid” for less “preferred” children. The potential negative 
consequences of the proposed auction model of adoption were not explored (Blackstone, Buck & 
Hakim, 2004) as this model has never been enacted. Many states do, however, currently 
incentivize the adoption of children with disabilities through larger adoption subsidies. 
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A market-driven model of adoption as outlined above has potential negative 
consequences for children and families. By providing a mechanism whereby children are 
assessed for their desirability, a two-tiered system is created where families interested in 
adopting will be limited by their financial capabilities as to how “desirable” of a child they are 
able to adopt. In such a scenario is possible that the intersection between resources and 
willingness to pay could lead to children who are deemed less desirable to be less likely to be 
adopted by families with the financial means. Desirability could mean very different things to 
potential adoptive families including that the child has fewer mental and physical health needs, 
be of a specific race/ethnicity, or of a specific age. This is just but one example of how a purely 
market-driven model of child welfare services could be unethical. 
In contrast to the hypothetical auction model described above, other market-driven 
privatization efforts have generally been proposed as cost-saving measures (Flaherty, Collins-
Camargo, & Lee, 2008). These efforts have varied from state-wide transitions from public to 
private child welfare systems, piece-meal contracting of some aspects of the child welfare 
system, hybrid system where private and public agencies work in collaboration, and 
demonstration projects in single counties or jurisdictions for a time-limited period. A review of 
the efforts, both successful and unsuccessful, provides a fuller understanding of the landscape 
within which this study takes place.  
2.3 Privatization Mechanisms 
Since the late 1990’s the child welfare systems of most states have established some 
privatization initiative (Crum, 1998). The earliest initiative was in 1992 with one district in 
Florida contracting services with a single private agency to provide services to 150 children in 
foster care (McCullough and Schmitt, 2005). By 2000, 29 states had privatization initiatives that 
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ranged from a single jurisdiction, to a statewide system of contracted private agencies 
(McCullough and Schmitt, 2005). 
The variation in structural designs and scope of the privatization initiatives makes it 
difficult to compare effectiveness across states (Collins-Camargo, McBeath & Ensign, 2011). 
Generally speaking, the structure relies on a contracted lead private agency to manage a service 
delivery network of other private agencies. The lead agency in this model is best compared to a 
managed care entity (MCE) where the MCE is responsible for differing degrees of responsibility 
(McCullough and Schmitt, 2005). The MCE is also a provider of services in addition to 
coordinating services provided by other private agencies (McCullough and Schmitt, 2005). 
Another privatization model is where the lead agency operates as a managed care organization 
(MCO) and does not provide services directly to consumers but solely coordinates the individual 
and network of providers of services (McCullough and Schmitt, 2005). 
There are two dominant types of privatization contracts: fee-for-service and performance-
based contracts (Freundlich and Gerstenzang, 2003). In a fee-for-service system a private 
agency, as the name suggests, is reimbursed based upon the services rendered. States that utilize 
performance-based contacts choose to prioritize, and incentivize, specific outcomes for the 
contracted agencies. These outcomes generally include targeted rates of youth in congregate 
care, youth achieving permanency (via adoption or other means) but can include whatever 
outcomes the state and private agency agree upon.  
While there is widespread adoption of privatized models of child welfare services, there 
has not been widespread evaluation of these initiatives. There are a number of states that have 
engaged in evaluation of the privatization efforts with a focus primarily on cost saving with little 
attention to child well-being outcomes (Barillas, 2010). A recent exception is a dissertation 
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focused only on timely exits from care in performance-based compared to non-performance 
based systems (Menozzi, 2016). Study findings supported the hypothesis that privatized states 
reduced time in care, but there were several limitations in regard to informing the broader policy 
debate. This study focused on privatization that occurred with states that chose to focus 
outcomes of contracts on reducing time in care, used a baseline in the 1990s early in the process 
of implementation, collapsed race into White, African American and all other, and examined age 
as infant versus other. The selection criteria and time period may bias results toward success in 
the outcome and potentially introduces problems with the changes in timelines specific to AFSA 
implementation in the late 1990s, and other trends like emphasis on kin placements, that may 
have altered some of the between state variability in outcomes noted by earlier studies using 
AFCARS data (e.g., Snowden, Scott & Sieracki, 2008). The latter collapsing of race and age 
categories may mask important variations that create an overestimate of the magnitude of 
particular demographic categories. Further the dependent variable was time in years. While some 
youth do stay in foster care for multiple years, current federal guidelines specifically limit this 
practice making days or months in care a more relevant and sensitive variable. Finally, the study 
relied on classification of privatization based on a university report which is posted but no longer 
available on Child Welfare Gateway. As there is no standard means by which privatization is 
reported to the federal government it is unclear how accurate this description was throughout the 
study years.  
A review of three examples of state implementation of privatized child welfare services 
and the subsequent outcomes for service delivery and child/family outcomes are provided to 
highlight variation (Ensign & Metzenthin, 2007; Hubel et al, 2013; Haslag, Matt, and Neal, 
2012). Thus far, there are mixed results from these studies. By 2007, nine states had ended their 
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privatized initiatives due to concerns regarding a decrease in the quality of services provided and 
poor child outcomes- such as length of time in care, placement type, and permanency outcomes 
(Flaherty, Collins-Camargo & Lee, 2008). Findings suggest that in states where privatization 
failed they were ill-equipped to transition from a public system of child welfare (Flaherty, 
Collings-Camargo, & Lee, 2008; Lawrence-Webb, Field, & Harrington, 2006; Barillas, 2010). 
Better understanding of states’ experiences with privatization sheds light on the market forces at 
work when these initiatives succeed and fail.  
2.3.1 Kansas  
The state of Kansas transitioned to a privatized system of child welfare in 1995. Kansas 
was one of the first states to implement a privatization initiative in part due to the overwhelming 
support of the political community. Rather than reforming the public child welfare system, 
Kansas chose to implement wide-reaching privatization initiatives. It is important to note that 
Kansas was subject to an out-of-court settlement with the American Civil Liberties Union at the 
time that the transition to privatization began and it was hoped by some in the state government, 
that by reforming the child welfare system, the settlement requirements would no longer be 
enforced as the services were no longer directly being provided by the state government but by 
contracted entities (Ensign, 2007). This transition took place quickly, and in retrospect, is 
considered to have lacked appropriate planning prior to implementation (Ensign, 2007). 
 Kansas implemented a multi-tiered privatized system where, in each of five regions of the 
state, agencies bid for competitive performance-based contracts to provide case management 
services to children in foster care. A separate bidding process was created for the family 
preservation services and a third statewide contract was awarded for the creation of an adoption 
provider network (Freundlich & Gerstenzang, 2003). Under this system the state offices would 
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continue to be responsible for the investigation, assessment, and removal of children who were 
reported to the state hotline for abuse and/or neglect (Freundlich & Gerstenzang, 2003). 
 Over the first four years of privatization, Kansas experienced significant increases in the 
cost expenditures that required legislative intervention to cover the state-mandated privatized 
services. Private agencies also experienced difficulties with one lead agency filing for 
bankruptcy and another terminating its contract with the state due to budgetary concerns (Ensign, 
2007). An independent audit, commissioned in 1999 found that the costs of the privatized child 
welfare system were 65% greater than anticipated (James Bell Associates, 2001). Kansas 
maintains a privatized system but has reverted to a fee-for-service system rather than a 
performance-based contract tied to child and family outcomes. It is anticipated that the 
public/private partnership in Kansas’ child welfare system will continue to evolve over time with 
changes to what types of services and in what capacities they are transferred from public 
agencies to privatized agency networks. 
2.3.2 Nebraska 
 In 2008, Nebraska undertook a statewide effort to privatize child welfare services. These 
efforts were advocated for by a stated need to improve child outcomes, protect children and 
improve service delivery to youth and families (Hubel et al, 2013). The proposed Nebraska 
system was an MCE structure with a lead agency identified for each of six regions and utilized a 
risk-based payment system. In contrast to fee-for-service reimbursement systems, a risk-based 
system has a guaranteed fixed rate of reimbursement that is paid in advance of services. The 
privatized system of services actually implemented in Nebraska only had five lead agencies as 
the sixth agency felt the funds allocated by the state were insufficient for the services expected. 
Consequently, the five lead agencies were responsible for approximately 8700 families across 
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Nebraska. By 2012 only one lead agency maintained a contract with the state of Nebraska. Each 
of the lead agencies terminating their contract with the state of Nebraska cited funding issues as 
the primary motivation to stop providing services through the MCE structure (Hubel et al, 2013).  
A comprehensive evaluation of the Nebraska statewide privatization initiative found that 
the cost to the state increased by 27% and the service delivery was of a lower quality and less 
consistent than when under a public model (Hubel et al, 2013).  In 2012, 4 years following the 
rollout of a statewide privatized system of child welfare services, Governor Heineman reported 
that Nebraska’s number of children in foster care was two times the national average (Heineman, 
2012). Based on reports, it is assumed that this increase of youth in foster care was not due to 
more entries of youth into care in Nebraska but a result of youth not progressing through the 
system and achieving permanency as frequently as they did under the prior system (Heineman, 
2012, Hubel et al, 2013). Later that same year Nebraska was fined for failing to comply with 
federal regulations that govern states with a privatized child welfare system. Subsequently the 
Nebraska legislature passed a number of child welfare reform bills that brought back most 
services under the umbrella of state responsibility (O’Hanlon, 2012). 
2.3.3 Missouri  
The state of Missouri began issuing fee-for-service contracts for private agencies to 
assume responsibilities for case management services for children in foster care in 1997. These 
contracts subsequently transitioned in 2005 to performance-based-contracts after it was 
determined that the fee-for service model provided incentives for agencies to maintain children 
in foster care rather than return the children to their families of origin or secure alternative long-
term placements (e.g. guardianship and adoption) (Haslag, Matt and Neal, 2012). The transition 
to performance-based contracts was mandated by the Missouri legislature, despite evidence that 
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measuring child and family outcomes in performance-based contracts is more difficult than the 
fee-for-service model (Perrins, 2008).  
Haslag, Matt, & Neal (2012) found that there were no direct cost savings to Missouri 
under the performance-based contract model. This was due to the fact that Missouri maintained 
an active public child welfare system that provided all levels of services to families in many 
cases that varies by county. Consequently, the Missouri model is an example of a public/private 
partnership with the public and private entities both assuming responsibility for family 
preservation, case management, and adoption services. The public child welfare agency is the 
sole provider of investigations and assessments of reports of child abuse and neglect. The public 
agency is also the only party charged with the authority to request removal of a child from their 
family of origin (Haslag, Matt, & Neal, 2012). 
2.4 Conclusion 
 The three examples outlined above demonstrate the variation in implementation and 
outcomes of statewide privatization efforts within the child welfare system. The failure of the 
Nebraska initiative has been attributed to a lack of adequate planning prior to implementing the 
privatization initiative (Hubel et al, 2013). The mixed results in Kansas are equally attributed to 
the over-reliance on political ideology in the face of contrary evidence as well as to an 
infrastructure that was ill equipped to scale-up a statewide initiative (Ensign, 2007). If Missouri 
can be considered a successful privatized system, this may be because there is sustained 
collaboration between public and private agencies. All approaches evolved over time, with the 
Nebraska model effectively transferring services back to the public sector.  
 Studies have just begun to assess the impact of privatization on child and family 
outcomes. Lawrence-Webb, Field, and Harrington (2006) found that the bureaucratic and 
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financial difficulties when a privatization initiative begins require so much effort that child and 
family outcomes are difficult to assess. One of the few studies that examined child outcomes in a 
privatized system found that youth experienced a greater number of foster care placements in a 
privatized system (Steen and Duran, 2013). Indeed, McBeath and colleagues (2014) identified 
over twenty key research questions that still need to be explored on the organizational change 
process that should guide future research within a privatized child welfare system (See Appendix 
D).  
In a study of the differences in the workforce of public and private agencies, 
Hollingsworth and colleagues (2010) found that public agency workers had higher levels of 
education, related work experience, and that private agency workers had more negative attitudes 
regarding parents of children in the child welfare system. This study provides important 
descriptive information regarding the workforce but made no attempts to link workforce 
characteristics to child and family outcomes. Some point out, however, that the requisite training 
of a privatized workforce poses additional start-up costs that are exacerbated by the high 
turnover rate in the privatized child welfare workforce (Ortega and Levy, 2002). This suggests 
that there may be an impact on outcomes. 
Zullo (2006) found that there were differences in how cases were allocated between 
public and private agencies. This has potential ramifications for service delivery if private 
agencies are disproportionately allocated cases with high service needs. In fact, Zullo (2006) 
found contradictory findings with private agencies more likely to be allocated cases with two-
parent families with fewer siblings that require parental psychological services. In contrast, 
public agencies were more likely to be allocated cases with more sibling groups and serious 
substance use problems among the parents (Zullo, 2006). There has not been enough 
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investigation into the allocation of cases between public and private agencies to determine if 
there are such consistent differences across locations. 
 The privatization efforts of the last 20 years have yielded mixed results in terms of cost 
savings and the sustainability. The associated child and family outcomes for privatized compared 
to public systems and among differing models of privatization are largely unexplored. This is a 
key gap in the knowledge base, especially considering the arguments in favor of privatization 
center on effective service delivery and improved child outcomes. Certainly, there is evidence to 
suggest that privatization initiatives are cumbersome and require significant planning and 
forethought. Without rigorous research into child and family outcomes, it is impossible to assess 
whether a privatized child welfare system is an improvement over a public child welfare system.  
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Chapter 3: Methods 
This study explored the relationship between privatization of foster care case management 
services and permanency outcomes for youth in foster care. There are two primary samples for 
this study which spans the time period of 2008-2014. A detailed description of the data sources, 
data management, and analysis plan will be provided in this chapter.   
3.1 Data Sources 
3.1.1 AFCARS  
The primary data source for this study is the Adoption and Foster Care Analysis and 
Reporting System (AFCARS) dataset. All fifty states, the district of Columbia, and Puerto Rico 
report case-level data about children in foster care that populates AFCARS. This dataset is 
maintained by the Children’s Bureau and is federally mandated. There are two yearly reporting 
periods that all title IV-E agencies must comply with (May 15 and November 14).  
Variables within AFCARS include demographic information including sex, date of birth, 
gender, race, ethnicity. Other variables include indicators for physical and mental health needs of 
the child in foster care; placement data including placement type (relative, foster, institution, 
independent living, etc.), number of placements, length of time in placement, and demographic 
details of the placement providers; case planning data including removal reason (neglect, 
physical abuse, sexual abuse, abandonment, child behavior problems, substance use of parent, 
etc.), case goal (reunification, adoption, emancipation, long-term foster care, guardianship), exit 
and entry in foster care, and exit reason from foster care. These variables exist for each year and 
can be linked across years using the AFCARS id within states to create a case history that for 
some states spans the entirety of the AFCARS timeframe of 1999-2015. The data quality and the 
percent of states reporting information, however, has improved over time with most states having 
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complete coverage for at least the past six years. All selected states had linkage available for the 
entire study window.  
3.1.2 Other data sources consulted  
Other data sources consulted to help build the sample frame included the federal Child 
and Family Service Review report (Child Welfare Gateway, 2017) to help identify the 
privatization status of a given state followed by a search of the state child welfare websites for 
those states with some mention of privatization in the federal report.  
3.1.3 Identifying Privatized States  
Aim 1 of this study requires that states with privatized foster care case management 
systems are compared to states with public foster care case management systems. It is important 
to note that many, if not most states, contract with private agencies and providers for at least 
some of their child welfare services including investigation of reports, Intensive In-home 
services, residential services, and, of course, foster care case management. This study is solely 
focused on the provision of foster care case management services as this is the most common 
focus of privatization. The foster care case manager is charged with making day-to-day decisions 
for youth in foster care with regards to placement, services, and permanency.  
 There is no one master list of privatized states by year. A number of efforts were made to 
identify states who privatized foster care case management services. The first step was to read, in 
their entirety, the Round 2 of the Child and Family Service Report (CFSR) for each state (Child 
Welfare Gateway, 2017). These reports provide details of services, contracts, and progress 
toward federally mandated competencies. The reports also explain any discrepancies or areas of 
concern within the state child welfare system. There is, however, no consistent format for 
reporting of privatization of child welfare services. For example, the state of New York reported 
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details of its privatization of foster care case management in a footnote whereas Nebraska 
outlined in detail the obstacles encountered when switching from public to private foster care 
case management. Consequently, a search of each CFSR was done using the terms “contract” 
and “private” to ensure that all mentions of privatization and/or contracts were captured. A list of 
nine states were identified that indicated they privatized foster care case management to some 
degree. An in-depth review of the nine state child welfare websites provided more detail 
regarding the degree of privatization and whether that included foster care case management 
specifically. This list varied from states that had 100% privatized systems during at least part of 
the study period of interest (Nebraska and Kansas) to demonstration projects or single county 
projects (Minnesota, Tennessee) and is summarized in Table 1.   
Table 1: Summarization of State Privatization Efforts 
State Private Services Contract Percent of Youth Served  
Alaska Family Reunification Services, Post 
Adoption Services 
PBC Statewide 
Alabama Therapeutic Foster Care PBC 151 youth in 2008 
Arizona Foster Family Recruitment/Licensing, in-
home services program 
PBC Statewide 
California Permanency Planning, foster parent 
training/licensing 
PBC 41 Counties 
Colorado Behavioral Health, family finding; case 
management 
 Statewide; select locations 
Connecticut Therapeutic foster care, foster and adoption 
support teams 
PBC Statewide 
Delaware Group homes, parent aide, home-based 
support 
PBC Statewide 
District of 
Columbia 
Family Preservation, low-moderate risk PBC District Wide 
Florida All services PBC Statewide 
Georgia Foster Care Attempt failed 2014, 2016; 
family finding, therapeutic foster care  
PBC Statewide 
Hawaii Family Strengthening Services, Substance 
Use 
PBC Statewide 
Idaho Resource Families PBC 2 Regions 
Illinois Foster Care, residential/group care PBC 75% of youth in state 
Indiana Hotline Calls; case management  PBC 1 county, regionally 
determined 
Iowa Resource families, family preservation, 
permanency programming 
PBC  
Kansas All Services PBC Statewide 
Kentucky Independent Living PBC Statewide 
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Louisiana Intensive-In home services, Independent 
Living 
PBC Statewide 
State Private Services Contract Percent of Youth Served  
Maine Family Reunification, home studies PBC Statewide 
Maryland Family Preservation PBC 6 of 18 departments 
Massachusetts Residential Services, hotline investigators, 
Intensive Foster Care 
Fee for 
Service 
Statewide 
Michigan Foster Care, Residential PBC 41% of youth in care 
Minnesota Adoption Services PBC Statewide 
Mississippi Intensive In-home Services, post-adoption PBC Statewide 
Missouri Foster care, adoption services PBC, Fee 
for Service 
5 regions across state 
Montana In-home reunification services PBC Larger communities, some 
rural 
Nebraska All services PBC/Risk-
Based 
Statewide until 2012, Omaha 
continues 
Nevada Supervised visitation, Independent living 
Specialist 
Fee for 
service 
Regional 
New Hampshire Family Support programs PBC Statewide 
New Jersey Post reunification services, intensive 
permanency services 
PBC Statewide 
New Mexico Adoptive and Foster homes PBC Statewide 
North Carolina Special Need Adoptions, Foster care PBC, fee 
for service 
Statewide 
North Dakota Adoption Services PBC Statewide 
Ohio 5-year demonstration project PBC 1 region 
Oklahoma Placement management, adoption   
Oregon Independent Living Programs, substance 
use; family based-services 
PBC Statewide; 13 counties 
Pennsylvania All child welfare services PBC Contracts procured by county 
Rhode Island Adoption services, foster homes PBC Statewide 
South Carolina Adoption services; case management for 
special needs youth 
PBC statewide 
South Dakota Independent Living program PBC Statewide 
Tennessee Visitation, home studies, mental health  PBC Statewide 
Texas Foster Care, Adoption PBC 7 counties 
Utah Foster family recruitment; respite care PBC statewide 
Vermont Post-adoption support, case management  PBC Determined by district 
Virginia Independent living PBC 5 regions 
Washington Foster Care Demonstration project; 
Independent Living 
PBC  
West Virginia Hotline services, home studies PBC Statewide 
Wisconsin Adoption; Foster Care PBC Statewide; Hennepin County 
Wyoming Residential Treatment PBC Statewide 
 
As illustrated, despite the large number of states that used a privatized model for some 
aspect of child welfare services, relatively few included foster care case management 
specifically. For states that did not privatize 100% of their foster care case management, a rule 
needed to be applied to determine whether or not to include as a privatized state in the present 
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study. This is because AFCARS does not have organizational level data, making it impossible to 
know if a youth is served by a private or public agency within a given state. Therefore, states 
were selected as privatized for analysis if they had 75% or more of youth served by a private 
foster care case manager. This cut-off was selected as to allow for sufficient certainty in analysis 
that differences between states was due to privatization. 
This yielded a final sample of 4 privatized states (Nebraska, Kansas, Illinois and Florida) 
that were matched according to socio-demographic factors primarily race and ethnicity with 4 
states that maintained public foster care case management. Note that “public system” states may 
be listed in Table 1 as privatized because they had contracts with private agencies for other 
ancillary services such as Intensive In-home services, family finding, or other services but foster 
care case management remained under the auspices of the public child welfare system. None of 
the public states selected in the present study, however had privatized foster care. The matching 
process required the identification of states in the same region of the United States as the private 
state, that utilized public foster care case management systems.  Next, states were evaluated on 
socio-demographic variables, (e.g. race and ethnicity) and the proportional size of the foster care 
population within the state.  Those that were most similar across these factors were selected as 
matches. This yielded stratified-matched states of Kansas (private) and Arkansas (public), 
Nebraska (private) and Iowa (public), Illinois (private) and Ohio (public), and Florida (private) 
and Georgia (public).    
Other matching techniques were considered including Propensity Score Matching (PSM), 
Mahalanobis Distance Matching (MDM) and Coarsened Exact Matching (CEM). However, 
matching techniques are not always preferable in observational studies and, as noted by Menozzi 
(2016), AFCARS lacks many of the predictor variables that might be desired to effectively use  
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Table 2:  State Demographic Comparisons Aim 1 Sample (2008) 
Private States  Florida Illinois Kansas Nebraska 
Number Served N 7455 5331 1761 1679 
Gender      
    Male  N(%) 3655 (49.03) 2701 (50.67) 819 (46.51) 862 (51.34) 
    Female N(%) 3800 (50.97) 2630 (49.33) 942 (53.49) 817 (48.66) 
Race      
   African-American N(%) 2906 (38.98) 2408 (45.17) 305 (17.32) 286 (17.03) 
   White N(%) 4661 (62.52) 2681 (50.29) 1450 (82.34) 994 (59.20) 
   Asian N(%) 47 (.63) 31 (.58) 6 (.34) 6 (.36) 
   Unknown N(%) 62 (.83) 207 (3.88) 14 (.80) 226 (13.46) 
   American-Indian N(%) 40 (.54) 9 (.17) 15 (.85) 183 (10.90) 
   Hawaiian N(%) 13 (.17) 0 5 (.28) 2 (.12) 
Hispanic        
   Yes N(%) 1126 (15.10) 335 (6.28) 122 (6.93) 191 (11.38) 
   No/Unknown N(%) 6329 (84.90) 5205 (97.64) 1639 (93.07) 1488 (88.62) 
Removal Reason      
   Physical Abuse N(%) 2737 (36.71) 1145 (21.48) 604 (34.30) 368 (21.92) 
   Neglect N(%) 5138 (68.92) 4060 (76.16) 1254 (71.21) 1388 (82.67) 
   Sex Abuse N(%) 671 (9.00) 126 (2.36) 212 (12.04) 86 (5.12) 
Diagnosed Disability      
   Yes N(%) 281 (3.83) 813 (15.38) 303 (17.21) 355 (21.14) 
   No N(%) 7053 (96.17) 4473 (84.62) 1458 (82.79) 1324 (78.86) 
DSM III Dx      
   Yes N(%) 102 (1.37) 564 (10.58) 248 (14.08) 186 (13.21) 
   No N(%) 7353 (98.63) 4767 (89.42) 1513 (85.92) 1222 (86.79) 
Age in Years  Mean(SD) 6.44(5.23) 5.79(5.32) 7.65(5.42) 6.92(5.44) 
Public States  Georgia Ohio Arkansas Iowa 
Number Served N 6367 4552 2140 1407 
Gender      
    Male N(%) 3151 (49.50) 2236 (49.15) 1024 (47.85) 669 (47.55) 
    Female N(%) 3215 (50.50) 2313 (50.85) 1116 (52.15) 738 (52.45) 
Race      
   African-American N(%) 3346 (52.55) 1677 (36.84) 617 (28.83) 204 (14.50) 
   White N(%) 3182 (49.98) 2793 (61.36) 1617 (75.56) 1050 (74.63) 
   Asian N(%) 43 (.68) 12 (.26) 20 (.93) 19 (1.35) 
   Unknown N(%) 51 (.80) 68 (1.55) 20 (.93) 117 (8.35) 
   American-Indian N(%) 18 (.28) 18 (.40) 25 (1.17) 35 (2.49) 
   Hawaiian N(%) 6 (.09) 6 (.13) 8 (.37) 10 (.71) 
Hispanic        
   Yes N(%) 505 (7.93) 196 (4.31) 172 (8.04) 139 (9.88) 
   No/Unknown N(%) 5862 (92.07) 4356 (95.69) 1968 (91.96) 1268 (90.12) 
Removal Reason      
   Physical Abuse N(%) 2024 (31.79) 1292 (28.38) 567 (26.50) 320 (22.74) 
   Neglect N(%) 5409 (84.95) 3278 (72.01) 1437 (67.15) 1077 (76.55) 
   Sex Abuse N(%) 302 (4.74) 288 (6.33) 300 (14.02) 99 (7.04) 
Diagnosed Disability      
   Yes N(%) 1336 (20.98) 197 (14.80) 156 (8.25) 256 (18.19) 
   No N(%) 5031 (79.02) 1134 (85.20) 1735 (91.75) 1151 (81.81) 
DSM III Dx      
   Yes N(%) 816 (12.82) 81 (1.78) 80 (3.90) 102 (7.25) 
   No N(%) 5551 (87.18) 4471 (98.22) 1973 (96.10) 1305 (92.75) 
Age in Years 
(Mean(SD)) 
Mean(SD) 7.35(5.76) 6.42(5.36) 7.16(5.37) 5.99(5.15) 
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these approaches. Further, the match is not as much about the individuals living in the state as it 
is the states themselves and with only four private states it was determined that there were 
insufficient variables at the state-level to make an appropriate state-to-state match. Ultimately, 
stratified-matching was chosen given the concerns outlined by King and Nielsen (2016) in using 
propensity scores for matching purposes. State demographic comparisons appear in Table 2. 
3.2 Data Management 
All data management efforts were conducted in SAS vs. 9.4. Although states are required 
to report to AFCARS, there are state variations in the data elements reported and/or the way in 
which data elements are recorded. Table 3 outlines the footnotes identified in AFCARS 
documentation about differences in how data is recorded across the states that were included in 
the study. A dichotomous variable was created to reflect whether or not an observation was 
within a state deemed private (Florida, Illinois, Kansas, or Nebraska) or public (Georgia, Ohio, 
Arkansas, and Iowa) according to the aforementioned definition.  
3.2.1 Dependent variables  
The present study is focused on permanency as an outcome for youth in care. Current 
policy mandates and services focus on shortening the time in a “non-permanent setting”, exiting 
to a desired permanent setting (i.e., reunification, adoption or guardianship), and remaining 
stable and safe in the setting following exit as measured by re-entry. Therefore, the three 
dependent variables of interest are: Time to permanency (time from entry to exit in the first spell  
during the study period), exit type (reunification, adoption, guardianship, runaway, transfer to 
other agency, aging out/remaining in care without exit, or death), and re-entry into care 
following an exit during the study period.  
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Table 3: Notes from AFCARS on Data for Included States 
Florida 
Performance-Based 
Contracts 
 
Excludes children whose 
most recent review is after 
their discharge date 
 
May not include 
dispositional hearings if they 
also meet requirements of a 
judicial review 
 
Some records show no 
placement because initial 
and only placement is a 
hospital, DJJ facility or 
runaway 
 
Does not exclude placements 
of less than 24 hours 
duration from placement 
count 
 
Does not capture trial home 
visits 
Illinois 
Performance-Based 
Contracts 
 
No Notes 
Kansas 
Performance-Based 
Contracts 
 
No Notes 
Nebraska 
Risk-Based 
Reimbursement and 
Performance-Based 
Contracts 
 
12 Counties deal with more 
cases than just those in their 
county 
 
provides an estimated DOB 
 
Unable to determine race 
includes ‘other’ 
 
Clinical diagnosis is required 
to be answered 
 
approved or unlicensed 
relative homes are included 
in relative foster homes 
 
State policy does not define 
“live with other relatives” as 
a case plan goal 
Georgia 
34 children who finalized to 
adoption had an improperly 
documented TPR 
 
Analysis of the file indicates 
that case managers have 
been confused about correct 
protocol for entering foster 
caretaker detailed 
information in the system 
 
1084 records show no family 
structure on relative 
placement, date of birth or 
race information 
Ohio 
215 records excluded where 
discharge date=removed date 
 
1005 records where child 
was >=19, subsequently 
excluded 
Arkansas 
 
No Notes 
Iowa 
Adoption workers cover 
more than one county, 
children appear to be from 
limited number of counties 
 
Clinical diagnosis is must be 
given by a qualified 
professional 
 
Defines physical abuse as 
damage to any bodily tissue 
that must undergo a healing 
process or results in death. 
 
Defines sexual abuse as 
commission of sexual 
offenses with or to a child as 
a result of acts or omissions 
of a caretaker 
 
Does not use emancipation, 
clients coded as aged out of 
the system 
 
Juvenile Justice population is 
included.  
Appendix to the AFCARS 2009 Foster Care File User’s Guide NDACAN Dataset Number Version 4 
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A caveat is needed in regard to re-entry and placement stability while in care. Because of 
the way AFCARS data are programmed, it is possible to count the number of placements in a 
given year but not the length of stay in a given type of placement.  Further dates are available 
only for a prior or current spell in foster care at the start of a reporting period and the most recent 
entry and or exit dates.  Aligning the dates of entry and exit has to be done with great care across  
linked years.  Further, if a child re-entered care multiple times within a given reporting year, 
middle entry dates would be lost.  Therefore, the re-entry variable includes the first re-entry 
noted in AFCARS following an exit from care.  While it is unclear how often interim spell dates 
are absent, given the median times in foster care and the time it takes to re-enter, this is likely to 
be a small proportion of cases.  
3.2.2 Control and Independent Variables  
Given the dearth of research specific to privatization, control variables were selected 
based on studies of foster care exits and re-entries reviewed earlier.  Covariates included in the 
models are gender (female or male), race (African American, American Indian/Alaskan Native, 
Asian, Hawaiian/Pacific Islander, Multiracial, White or unknown), ethnicity (Hispanic or not), 
mental health diagnosis (yes/no), diagnosed  
disability(yes/no), other medical diagnosis(yes/no), placement type [pre-adoptive, relative foster 
home (kinship care), non-relative foster home, group home/institution, independent living (for 
youth emancipating from care), runaway, or trial home visit], age in years at entry, number of 
placements, and removal reason (neglect, physical abuse, sexual abuse, other). Limitations on 
control variables included are due to the information available in AFCARS. For example, 
AFCARS does not provide data on family or caregiver risk factors.   
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Original variables that included a “not applicable” or “not yet determined” option was 
being of Hispanic origin, diagnosis of a disability, other medical diagnosis, and mental health 
diagnosis were recoded to dummy variables with “not applicable” and “not yet determined” 
recoded to “no”. This decision was because states were inconsistent with using the “not 
applicable” and “not yet determined” codes and inclusion of these codes could bias the models. 
There was a proportionally small amount of missing data, as noted in Tables 5 and 8.  
3.3 Sample Description 
3.3.1 Aim 1 Sample 
 For the purposes of this study, a cohort of entries into foster care was identified for the 
year of 2008 (n=52,569). These cases were tracked from the time of entry through 2014 or until a 
terminal exit occurred. Data are linked across years by a unique child id within state.  While 
AFCARS extends back into the mid-1990s, many states did not consistently report data until 
relatively recently. Further, it is unclear whether measuring privatization very early in the 
adoption process would result in findings that are stable given the significant change in uptake of 
this reform since 2000.  This time period was also selected as it captures the time period when all 
of the states had private foster care case management, is sufficiently past the implementation of 
the Adoption and Safe Families Act (ASFA) which instituted permanency timelines for youth in 
foster care and is before the implementation of Fostering Connections to Success (2008) efforts 
which also targeted enhancing permanency outcomes for youth in care.  
If a youth re-entered care after an exit, this was used as a marker for stability of 
permanency, but the youth was not tracked through the subsequent spells in care. Cases were not 
limited to first entries and the mean number of total prior removal was 1.21 (SD=.51). Deaths 
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that occurred to youth who were in foster care were not excluded from analysis. Table 3 shows 
the variables of interest by the eight states in Aim 1.  
3.3.2 Aim 2 Sample  
This aim focused on how child level outcomes may change overtime as privatization is 
implemented compared to a state that remained public. This analysis attempted to determine if 
there were changes in the trajectory of outcomes following a policy change (privatization and 
then subsequent return to public foster care case management). Nebraska was selected as the 
state to study these changes because the transition from public child welfare to private child 
welfare and back to public child welfare all took place within the timeframe that data is available 
from AFCARS. While other states did experience shifts in privatization, states such as, Kansas, 
Florida and Illinois began privatizing child welfare prior to reliable AFCARS data collection and 
therefore, cases could not be tracked throughout these changes. The state of Iowa was selected as 
the public child welfare comparison based on having a child welfare system of comparable size 
and similar sociodemographic factors to the foster care population of Nebraska. All youth who 
entered into foster care were examined for every year from 2008-2014 for Nebraska and Iowa 
(n=706,208).  
3.4 Data Analysis Plan 
3.4.1 Aim 1  
The dependent variables of interest for analysis are length of time in care (continuous), 
exit reason, and re-entry (both categorical). The primary independent variable was privatization. 
Covariates included in the models are gender (female or male), race (African American, 
American Indian/Alaskan Native, Asian, Hawaiian/Pacific Islander, Multiracial, White or 
unknown), ethnicity (Hispanic or not), mental health diagnosis (yes/no), diagnosed  
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disability(yes/no), other medical diagnosis(yes/no), placement type [pre-adoptive, relative foster 
home (kinship care), non-relative foster home, group home/institution, independent living (for 
youth emancipating from care), runaway, or trial home visit], age in years at entry, number of 
placements, and removal reason (neglect, physical abuse, sexual abuse, other). 
Bivariate analyses included Spearman correlations, chi-square and t-tests as appropriate 
to the dependent variable of interest. Three different Multi-level models were tested for each 
dependent variable: 
1) 2-level multi-level model of Individuals nested within counties 
2) 2-level multi-level model of Individuals nested within states 
3) 3-level multi-level model of Individuals nested within counties, nested within states 
Multi-level models were chosen not only because of the nature of clustering of children within 
geographic units but because some studies have found significant variation in permanency 
outcomes within states (e.g., Courtney & Hook, 2012). 
All linear models were run using PROC MIXED to assess both fixed and random effects 
in SAS vs. 9.4. This model build approach follows the recommendations outlined by Luke 
(2007). For each of these nested models a secondary model build approach was undertaken to 
finalize the fixed and random effects within each model. This approach, as recommended by 
Bell, Ene, Smiley, and Schoeneberger (2013) is outlined in Table 4.  
All binary models were run using PROC GLIMMIX to assess both fixed and random 
effects in SAS vs 9.4. The model specification for the binary models was informed by guidelines 
outlined by Bell and colleagues (2013) as well as Kiernan, Tao and Gibbs (2012). There are nine 
possible exit types, however models were run on a collapsed categorical variable with 4 levels 
(0=no exit, 1=reunification, 2=live with a relative/guardianship, 3=adoption, 4=other). Models 
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were first attempted on the full 9-level variable, but the models failed to converge due to over-
specification. Models were also attempted as binary logistic models with dummy variable for 
seven of the nine outcome variables.  Child death (n=15) and runaway (n=16) were too rare of 
events within this sample for the models to yield meaningful results. Consequently, these 
observations were excluded from this set of models. The binary logistic models yielded 
inconsistent results, with some models being over-specified and failing to converge.   
When convergence failed, the models were re-specified following recommendations 
outlined by Kiernan, Tao, and Gibbs (2012). These re-specification efforts included using 
INITGLM option in the PROC GLIMMIX statement to limit the number of outer iterations, 
TECH=NRRIDG and TECH=NEWRAP in the NLOPTIONS statement which is indicated in 
binary models, increasing the number of optimizations using MAXOPT to 20,000, and 
increasing the number of iterations using MAXITER to 20,000. Each of these efforts were tried 
individually and in conjunction but three models still failed to converge- likely due to the fact 
that even in a very large sample some of the exit types are comparatively rare and this in 
combination with the number of levels of control variables was problematic. Consequently, a 
collapsed exit reason variable was used for binary analysis of exits with 4 levels (0=no exit, 
1=reunification, 2=living with a relative/guardianship, 3=adoption, 4=other). 
3.4.2 Aim 2  
Difference-in-difference analyses were run for two outcomes of interest: exit type and length of 
time in care. For exit type, rates of youth exiting to adoption and reunification were selected as 
those are the prioritized exit types as stated in Nebraska’s CFSR. Each was treated as a discrete 
entity with no matching of case ids across years. In a difference-in-differences analysis there is 
no assumption of independence of observation so there was no need to match 
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Table 4: Model Build Approach for 2- and 3-Level Multi-Level Models 
 2-Level Models  
Model 1 
Null Model 
Model 2 
 
Model 3 
 
Model 4 
 
Final Model 
 
 
No predictor, 
only random 
effect for the 
intercept 
Model 1 + 
level 1 fixed 
effects 
Model 2 + 
random slopes 
for level 1 
predictors 
Model 2 + 
random 
slopes for 
level 1 
predictors 
Model 4 + 
Interactions 
 
      
3-Level Models  
Model 1 
Null Model 
Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Final Model 
No 
predictors, 
only random 
effect for 
intercept 
Model 1 + 
level 1 fixed 
effects 
Model 2 + 
random 
slopes for 
level 1 
predictors 
Model 3 + 
level 2 fixed 
effects 
Model 4 + 
random 
slopes for 
level 2 
predictors 
Model 5 + 
level 3 fixed 
effects and 
interactions 
                                                       Model Fit 
AIC BIC ICC VPC   
Smaller is 
Better for 
overall model 
Smaller is 
Better for 
overall model 
Larger is 
better fit for 
2nd level 
predictor 
Larger is 
better fit for 
2nd level 
predictor 
  
 
observations across years. Therefore, each year was treated as a discrete time frame (Abadie, 
2005). For this reason, re-entry was not used as an outcome of interest in Aim 2. In accordance 
with a difference-in-difference analysis, dummy variables were created for the state variable 
(0=Iowa, 1=Nebraska), as well as for each year (in09-in14 where 0=no case in that year and 
1=case in that year), and finally dummy variables were created for each time period (private: 
0=no, 1=yes; post: 0=no, 1=yes). Two models were run for each outcome variable, one using 
‘private’ as the interaction term with the state dummy variable and one using ‘post’ as the 
interaction term with the state dummy variable.  
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A key assumption of a difference-in-differences analysis is that there are parallel trends 
in the period prior to the treatment period, what would be the privatization period for this study.  
This assumption appeared violated based on graphs of trends (see Results). The round 2 CFSR 
for both states were analyzed in detail to confirm that there were no statewide efforts targeting 
adoption and/or reunification during the timeframe leading up to privatization of Nebraska’s 
child welfare system. In 2009, Iowa awarded a 3-year grant to run a family finding program to 
facilitate adoption services as implementation of the Fostering Connections to Success and 
Increasing Adoptions Act of 2008. This effort was begun in 26 counties with a target service 
population of 200 youth. With regards to increasing reunification of youth in foster care, in 2007 
Iowa piloted a parent-partner program for families with youth in care with a case goal of 
reunification. This program was ultimately expanded to 22 counties across the state by July of 
2009. By the time of the round 2 CFSR report, 450 families were served by this report, but no 
indication was provided as to whether participation in this program increased likelihood of 
reunification or speed with which this goal was attained. These two efforts alone would not 
explain the difference in the trends of exit out of care prior to privatization. No other state-wide 
policy was identified that could account for this difference. The difference-in-difference analysis 
was conducted despite this violation of the assumption.  
  
47 
 
Chapter 4: Results 
As outlined in Chapter 3, the analyses for both Aim1 and Aim 2 were conducted following 
extensive data cleaning and management of the corresponding sub-samples of the AFCARS 
dataset. Univariate and bivariate analysis was conducted for all variables of interest and 
covariates. Because of the very large sample sizes, only those findings that are practically large 
and significant or non-significant are noted. Univariate analyses for both aims are presented first 
to provide an overview of the distribution of cases by independent and control variables.  
The research questions for the present study were (1) Do youth receiving private foster 
care case management experience differential permanency (time to exit and type of exit) & 
stability (re-entry into care) outcomes when compared to youth receiving public foster care case 
management? and, Aim 2) Do changes in privatization (onset and de-privatization) of foster care 
case management services impact permanency outcomes for youth in foster care? 
4.1 Bivariate Analyses 
Spearman correlations, chi-squares, and t-tests were run for both Aim 1 and Aim 2 
samples. Spearman correlations were run to account for the categorical and skewed count 
variables. Tables 5 and 6 show bivariate differences between private and public states according 
to categorical or continuous variable types and independent as compared to dependent variables.   
4.1.1 Aim 1  
Due to the large sample size, of more interest are the variables where no significant 
difference was found. Among independent categorical variables (Table 5) there was no 
difference by privatization in gender (c2=2.01, p=.16), being categorized as Asian c2=3.67,  
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Table 5: AIM 1: Bivariate Relationships of Predictor and Dependent Variables to Private Vs. Public Status (8 State 
Sample) 
 Total Sample Missing Private Public Bivariate 
 N(%) N(%) N(%) N(%) X2(p) 
Gender    
      Male 26912 (50.81) 11(0%) 14231(50.52) 12681(51.14) 2.01(.16) 
      Female 26055 (49.19)  13938(49.48) 12117(48.86)  
Race      
       White 32757(61.83) 0(0%) 17537(62.26) 15220(61.35) 4.61(.0319) 
       African-American 19131(36.11) 0(0%) 9845(34.95) 9286(37.43) 35.17(<.0001) 
       Asian 298(.56) 0(0%) 142(.50) 156(.63) 3.67(.055) 
       Am. Indian/Alaska  680(1.28) 0(0%) 463(1.64) 217(.87) 61.56(<.0001) 
       Hawaiian/Pac. Isl. 86(.16) 0(0%) 32(.11) 54(.22) 8.81(.003) 
       Unknown 1450(2.76) 353(1%) 838(2.97) 612(2.5) 10.91(.001) 
       Multiracial 966(3.16) 0(0%) 323(2.00) 643(4.46) 151.03(<.0001) 
Ethnicity      
       Hispanic 4600(8.68) 0(0%) 3023(10.73) 1577(6.36) 1325.23(<.0001) 
       Not-Hispanic 27782 (90.92)  14389 (89.08)   13393(92.97)  
Diagnosed Disability      
       Yes 5892(13.00) 7653(14%) 3127(11.21) 2765(15.86) 3909.2 (<.0001) 
       No/Undetermined 23264 (86.37)  24767(88.79) 14666(84.14)  
Other Medical Issue      
       Yes 2473(4.74) 788(1%) 1231(4.47) 1242(5.04) 9.22(.002) 
       No 49717(95.26)  26301(95.53) 23416(94.96)  
Mental Health Dx      
       Yes 3711(7.11) 788(1%) 2120(7.70) 1591(6.45) 30.67(<.0001) 
        No 48479(92.89)  25412(92.30) 23067(93.55)  
Removal Reason      
        Physical Abuse 9057(17.10) 17(0%) 4854(17.23) 4203(16.95) .722(.3954) 
        Sexual Abuse 2084(3.93)  1095(3.89) 989(3.99) .36(.5471) 
        Neglect 23041(43.51)  11840(42.03) 11201(45.18) 53.16(<.0001) 
Casegoal      
        Reunification 36206(71.87) 2602(5%) 20063(72.10) 16143(71.58) 3085.30(<.0001) 
        Live with Relatives  748(1.48)  223(.80) 525(2.33)  
        Adoption 3073(6.10)  2369(8.51) 704(3.12)  
        Long-term foster 943(1.87)  571(2.05) 372(1.65)  
        Emancipation 960(1.91)  626(2.25) 334(1.48)  
        Guardianship 1632(3.24)  1578(5.67) 54(.24)  
        Not yet established 6814(13.53)  2395(8.61) 4419(19.60)  
Placement Setting      
        Pre-adoptive home 473(.90) 240(0%) 348(1.24) 125(.51) 3274.35(<.0001) 
        Relative foster home 17273(32.75)  12192(43.30) 5081(20.67)  
        Non-relative foster 22229(42.15)  9721(34.53) 12508(50.88)  
        Group home 2704(5.13)  1282(4.55) 1422(5.78)  
        Institution 4070(7.72)  1735(6.16) 2335(9.50)  
        Independent Living 130(.25)  70(.25) 60(.24)  
        Runaway 587(1.11)  240(.85) 347(1.41)  
        Trial home visit 5272(10.00)  2568(9.12) 2704(11.00)  
DEPENDENT VARIABLES     
Exit Reason      
        N/A (Still in care) 25519(49.17) 1079(2%) 16449(60.29) 9070(36.84) 5037.38(<.0001) 
        Reunification 15585(30.03)  7067(25.90) 8518(34.60)  
        With relative 3797(7.32)  306(1.12) 3491(14.18)  
        Adoption 2961(5.71)  1578(5.78) 1383(5.62)  
       Emancipation 1815(3.50)  713(2.61) 1102(4.48)  
       Guardianship 1879(3.62)  1077(3.95) 802(3.26)  
       Other Agency 171(.33)  49(.18) 122(.50)  
       Runaway 128(.25)  23(.08) 105(.43)  
       Child Death 44(.08)  20(.07) 24(.10)  
Re-entry (as of 2015)      
       Yes 6973 (13.16) 0 3775(13.40) 3198(12.89) 3.01(.08) 
       No 46005 (86.84)  24394(86.60) 21611(87.11)  
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p=.055, a removal reason of physical abuse (c2=.722, p=.40) or sexual abuse (c2=.36, p=.55). 
Among dependent variables there was no difference in proportion of youth who re-entered case 
(c2=3.01, p=.08), but there was a practically large difference in exit from care. Youth served in 
privatized states were almost twice as likely to still be in care during the observation period and 
were many times less likely to exit to relative care. 
In regard to continuous variables, the largest practical difference can be seen in the length 
of time in care between privatized and public systems (see Table 6). The difference in total time 
in care (days in the spell) was about 240 days or nearly 8 months with the youth in privatized 
states staying longer. 
Table 6: Bivariate Relationships Private vs. Public of Continuous Variables (8 State Sample) 
 
 Total Sample Private Public Bivariate 
 Mean(SD) Mean(SD) Mean(SD) t(p) 
     
Total Number 
Removals 
1.21(.54) 1.27(.58) 1.29(.67) -3.88(.0001) 
     
Days in current 
placement 
103.17(93.74) 114.1(95.09) 91.82(93.02) -27.09(<.0001) 
     
Age at 
Removal 
6.59(5.40) 6.36(5.29) 6.85(5.51) 7.97(<.0001) 
     
Number of 
placements 
2.67(3.37) 1.75(1.38) 1.71(1.22) -3.09(.002) 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE    
     
Total Days of 
Spell 
559.04(574.97) 672(642.7) 432.5(455.9) -37.86(<.0001) 
     
 
 Next relationships among the predictor variables were assessed to look for potential 
problems with multi-collinearity in multivariate models. Table 7 shows the correlation matrix for 
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Aim 1 sample of 52,569 youth in eight states (4 public and 4 private). For the Aim 1 sample, 
there are numerous significant correlations, but given the large sample size and the fact that the 
majority of the correlations are weak in magnitude there is little concern of multicollinearity. 
There is a small positive relationship between having a mental health diagnosis and another 
medical diagnosis (r=.19, p<.0001). The remaining correlations are weak, however due to the 
large sample size, the significant correlations are not practically significant and do not indicate 
issues with multicollinearity. 
4.1.2 Aim 2  
Similar findings were found in the bivariate analysis for the Aim 2 (Nebraska vs. Iowa) 
comparison state sample, as shown in Table 8 for the categorical variables and Table 9 for the 
continuous variables. Gender is not significantly different in the Aim 2 sample (c2=.04, p=.84), 
nor is there a difference between Nebraska and Iowa youth in foster care based on sex abuse as a 
removal reason (c2=2.48, p=.12).  
Table 9 illustrates between state differences for continuous independent and dependent 
variables. There was no significant difference in the Aim 2 sample between Nebraska and Iowa 
on the total number of removals (t=1.18, p=.24) with Nebraska foster care population having a 
mean of 1.30 (SD=.61) removals and Iowa foster care youth having a mean of 1.32(SD=.73) 
removals. 
  Table 10 shows the correlation matrix for the Aim 2 sample (n=11,947) for the 
independent variables to be included in the two-state model. In contrast to the Aim 1 sample, 
there is a strong negative correlation between diagnosed disability and mental health diagnosis 
(r=-.79, p<.0001). There is also a moderate negative correlation between case goal and current 
placement setting (r=-.499, p<.0001), but given the large sample size and there is little concern  
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Table 7: Correlation Matrix for Independent Variables: AIM 1 (8 State Sample) 
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American Indian --                  
African-American -.0710 --                 
Hawaiian -.0028 -.0197 --                
Asian -.0064 -.0445 -.0018 --               
White -.1200 -.8386 -.0333 -.0752 --              
Hispanic -.0087 -.1842 .0035 -.0120 .1256 --             
Multiracial -.0187 -.1304 -.0051 -.0117 -.2204 -.0152 --            
Race Unknown -.0189 -.1321 -.0052 -.0119 -.2232 .1603 -.0347 --           
Current Placement .0187 -.0376 .0127 .0158 -.0035 -.0018 .0013 .0645 --          
Neglect .0020 .0357 .0043 -.0020 .0238 -.0132 -.0049 -.0238 -.0699 --         
Physical Abuse -.0251 .0533 -.0057 .0057 -.0445 .0306 .0080 -.0127 -.0283 -.1081 --        
Sex Abuse -.0126 -..0415 .0385 .0385 .0418 .0384 -.0079 -.0050 .0115 -.0797 -.0397 --       
Gender -.0034 -.0098 -.0057 -.0053 .0154 .0032 -.0009 -.0107 -.0248 .0105 -.0001 .0863 --      
Age (years) -.0008 .0004 -.0024 .0151 .0120 -.0317 -.0454 -.0077 .3003 -.1618 .0530 .0941 .0283 --     
Other Medical  .0096 -.0046 -.0001 -.0051 .0024 -.0153 -.0005 -.0026 .0620 .0372 .0056 -.0028 -.0360 .0278 --    
DSM III Dx .0199 -.0287 -.0051 .0078 .0255 -.0261 -.0106 -.0046 .1455 .0143 -.0013 .0070 -.0279 .2281 .1876 --   
Diagnosed Disability .0077 -.0177 -.0034 .0050 .0141 -.0368 -.0082 -.0109 .1387 .0418 .0058 .0023 -.0387 .1806 .6204 .7684 --  
Number of Placements .0136 .0615 -.0001 -.0147 -.0413 -.0236 -.0013 -.0401 .1456 .0252 .0228 .0155 -.0055 .1531 .0655 .1455 .1387 -- 
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Table 8: Bivariate Relationships Nebraska vs. Iowa Sample, Categorical Variables 
 Total Sample Missing Nebraska Iowa Bivariate 
 N(%) N(%) N(%) N(%) X2(p) 
Gender      
      Male 6553 (54.87) 4(.00) 2977 (54.97) 3576 (54.79) .0383 (.8449) 
      Female 5390 (45.13)  2439 (45.03) 2951 (45.21)  
Race      
       White 8196 (68.60) 0(.00) 3288 (60.70) 4908 (75.16) 287.54 (<.0001) 
       African-American 2252 (18.85) 0(.00) 1076 (19.86) 1176 (18.01) 6.65 (.0099) 
       Asian 94 (.79) 0(.00) 34 (.63) 60 (.92) 3.22 (.07) 
       Am. Indian/Alaska  736 (6.16) 0(.00) 547 (10.10) 189 (2.89) 265.76 (<.0001) 
       Hawaiian/Pac. Isl. 24 (.20) 0(.00) 1 (.02) 23 (.35) 16.45 (<.0001) 
Ethnicity      
       Hispanic 1164 (9.74) 0(.00) 642 (11.85) 522 (7.99) 348.16 (<.0001) 
       Not-Hispanic 10783 (90.26)  4775 (88.15) 6008 (92.01)  
Diagnosed Disability      
       Yes 4741 (39.89) 62(1%) 2831 (52.86) 1910 (29.25) 741.72 (<.0001) 
       No/Undetermined 7144 (60.11)  2525 (47.14) 4619 (70.75)  
Other Medical Issue      
       Yes 2236 (19.03) 198(2%) 1545 (29.60) 691 (10.58) 680.59 (<.0001) 
       No 9513 (80.97)  3675 (70.40) 5838 (89.42)  
Mental Health Dx      
       Yes 3541 (30.14) 198(2%) 2187 (41.90) 1354 (20.74) 616.76 (<.0001) 
        No 8208 (69.86)  3033 (58.10) 5175 (79.26)  
Child Behavior Problems  3(0)    
        Yes 3907 (32.71)  1739 (32.12) 2168 (33.20 1.57 (.21) 
        No 8037 (67.29  3675 (67.88) 4362 (66.80)  
Removal Reason      
        Physical Abuse 1213 (10.16) 3(0) 609 (11.25) 604 (9.25) 12.96 (.0003) 
        Sexual Abuse 437 (3.66) 3(0) 182 (3.36) 255 (3.91) 2.48 (.1153) 
        Neglect 4260 (35.67) 3(0) 2427 (44.83) 1833 (28.07) 362.26 (<.0001) 
Casegoal      
        Reunification 6080 (51.67) 181(0) 3028 (56.60) 3052 (47.57) 2624.54 (<.0001) 
        Live with Relatives  386 (3.28)  0 386 (6.02)  
        Adoption 2720 (23.12)  1107 (20.69) 1613 (25.14)  
        Long-term foster 1258 (10.69)  0 1258 (19.61)  
        Emancipation 631 (5.36)  631 (11.79) 0  
        Guardianship 680 (5.78)  573 (10.71) 107 (1.67)  
        Not yet established 11 (.09)  11 (.21) 0  
Placement Setting      
        Pre-adoptive home 1160 (9.71) 0(0) 120 (2.22) 1040 (15.93) 1011.88 (<.0001) 
        Relative foster home 1291 (10.81)  799 (14.75) 492 (7.53)  
        Non-relative foster 2923 (24.47)  1607 (29.67) 1316 (20.15)  
        Group home 962 (8.05)  360 (6.65) 602 (9.22)  
        Institution 683 (5.72)  442 (8.16) 241 (3.69)  
        Independent Living 291 (2.44)  148 (2.73) 143 (2.19)  
        Runaway 208 (1.74)  127 (2.34) 81 (1.24)  
        Trial home visit 4429 (37.07)  1814 (33.49) 2615 (40.05)  
DEPENDENT VARIABLE     
Exit Reason      
        N/A (Still in care) 5596 (46.84) 0(0) 2618 (48.33) 2978 (45.66) 144.23 (<.0001) 
        Reunification 3518 (29.45)  1633 (30.15) 1885 (28.87)  
        With relative 40 (.33)  0 40 (.61)  
        Adoption 1434 (12.00)  538 (9.93) 896 (13.72)  
       Emancipation 746 (6.24)  307 (5.67) 439 (6.72)  
       Guardianship 527 (4.41)  248 (4.58) 279 (4.27)  
       Other Agency 42 (.35)  42 (.78) 0  
       Runaway 40 (.33)  27 (.50) 13 (.20)  
       Child Death 4 (.03)  4 (.07) 0  
Ever Adopted      
       Yes 398 (3.33) 0(0) 54 (1.00) 344 (5.27) 1986.57 (<.0001) 
       No 11549 (96.67)  5363 (99.00) 6186 (94.74)  
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Table 9: Bivariate Relationships Iowa vs. Nebraska Sample, Continuous Variables 
 Total Sample Nebraska Iowa Bivariate 
 Mean(SD) Mean(SD) Mean(SD t(p) 
     
Total Number 
Removals 
1.29(.67) 1.30(.61) 1.32(.73) 1.18(.24) 
     
Age at End of Year 10.71(5.96) 11.10(6.04) 10.63(6.03) -4.25(<.0001) 
     
Number of 
placements 
3.66(3.43) 4.03(3.99) 3.55(3.26) -7.12(<.0001) 
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Table 10: Correlation Matrix for Independent Variables for AIM 2 (Nebraska and Iowa)  
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American Indian --                  
African-American -0.1030 --                 
Hawaiian -0.0037 -0.0216 --                
Asian -0.0071 -0.0381 -0.0100 --               
White -0.3330 -0.6280 -0.0040 -0.1071 --              
Hispanic -0.0768 0.0828 -0.0623 0.0247 0.0877 --             
CaseGoal 0.0306 0.0009 -0.0051 0.0042 0.0178 0.0141 --            
Exit Reason 0.0040 -0.0518 -0.0023 -0.0093 0.0177 0.0346 0.06551 --           
Current Placement -0.0112 -0.0380 0.0018 -0.0058 0.0100 0.0221 -0.49851 0.0694 --          
Neglect 0.0345 0.0340 -0.0022 -0.0129 -0.0452 -0.0480 0.02634 -0.0208 -0.1461 --         
Physical Abuse -0.0158 -0.0019 -0.0089 -0.0080 0.0142 -0.0037 0.02664 -0.0121 -0.0397 -0.0131 --        
Sex Abuse -0.0221 -0.0392 -0.0087 0.0180 0.0501 0.0018 0.08876 -0.0189 -0.0430 -0.0055 0.0319 --       
Gender 0.0233 -0.0092 -0.0106 0.0087 0.0006 0.0027 0.07737 0.0352 -0.0747 0.0549 0.0209 0.0634 --      
Child Behavior -0.0570 -0.0248 0.0046 -0.0136 0.0413 0.0190 -0.07711 -0.0357 0.2724 -0.4532 -0.1801 -0.0532 -0.1288 --     
Other Medical  -0.0148 -0.0133 -0.0219 -0.0237 0.0347 0.0013 0.13754 -0.0421 -0.0865 0.0399 0.0160 0.0403 -0.0896 0.0518 --    
DSM III Dx -0.0316 -0.0058 -0.0215 -0.0063 0.0322 -0.0023 0.20147 -0.0254 -0.0609 -0.1036 0.0008 0.0546 -0.0274 0.2558 0.2708 --   
Diagnosed Disability 0.0339 0.0197 0.0233 0.0095 -0.0497 0.0161 -0.23563 0.0325 0.1357 0.0321 -0.0128 -0.0620 0.0499 -0.1668 -0.5862 -0.7941 --  
Ever Adopted -0.0306 -0.0396 0.0054 -0.0001 0.0634 0.0451 0.05492 -0.0042 0.0031 -0.0634 0.0209 0.0271 -0.0102 0.0259 -0.0602 -0.0631 0.0566 -- 
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of multicollinearity. Similar to the Aim 1 sample, the majority of significant correlations are 
weak and therefore do not indicate issues with multicollinearity for the subsequent multivariate 
models. 
4.2 Multivariate Analyses 
4.2.1 Aim 1: Time to Permanency  
Multi-level linear models were run using PROC MIXED with Time to Permanency as the 
dependent variable. Significant parameters are in bold in each table. Table 11 has the full model 
results for the 2-level model of individuals nested in counties as well as the 2-level model of 
individuals nested in states. Two-level models allow for comparison between considering county 
level variation or state level variation as the more important factor. Table 12 illustrates the final 
model for a 3-level model of individuals, nested in counties, nested in states.  
The significant main fixed effects in the 2-level county model include the presence of a 
diagnosed disability (b=118.51, t=3.85, p=.0001), age in years (b=-10.45, t=-11.83, p<.0001), 
number of placements (b=91.75, t=22.78, p<.0001), and private foster care (b=202.29, t=28.61, 
p<.0001). All placement types were associated with longer stays in comparison to trial visit 
home, which makes sense given that exit is a precursor to finalizing reunification. Trial home 
visit was selected as the reference group as youth placed in this setting are conceivably the 
closest to achieving permanency (reunification in this case). These results indicate that youth 
with a diagnosed disability take 118.5 days longer to achieve permanency than youth without a 
diagnosed disability. Similarly, for every additional placement a child in foster care experiences, 
it takes an additional 92 days to achieve permanency. Youth removed for physical abuse stayed 
fewer days than youth placed for reasons other than maltreatment, but the difference (slightly 
over 8 days was not large). Youth served by private foster care case managers take 202 days 
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longer to achieve permanency than youth served by public foster care case managers. Interaction 
terms suggest that for youth served by privatized agencies, number of placements is not as 
strongly associated with longer stays although it does not moderate the effect by a practically 
large number of days compared to the joint increase associated with each  
Table 11: 2 Level Multi-Level Models with Time to Permanency as Outcome (8 State Sample) 
 2 Level (County) Model 2 Level (State) Model 
Fixed Effects b SE t ratio b SE t ratio 
Time to Permanency 
(Intercept) 
-40.1745 52.4154 .77 -2.11 78.33 -.03 
Gender -15.53 4.04 -3.84 -12.32 4.17 -2.95 
Race (Ref=Unknown)     
      White -17.29 12.69 -1.36 30.16 20.05 1.50 
      African-American 7.09 17.60 .40 77.01 17.99 4.28 
      Asian 108.69 75.79 1.43 46.75 33.87 1.38 
      Hawaiian/PI -94.07 73.04 -1.29 -57.39 69.69 -.82 
      Am. Indian/AK  -1.71 23.68 -.07 12.51 23.25 .54 
      Multiracial -53.10 16.77 -3.17 63.75 18.45 3.46 
Hispanic -12.75 7.48 -1.70 20.13 9.13 2.20 
Mental Health DX 14.90 29.83 .50 14.23 20.80 .68 
Diagnosed Disability 118.51 30.79 3.85 67.72 23.84 2.84 
Other Medical DX 13.69 23.94 .57 22.14 13.64 1.62 
Placement Type (Ref=Trial Home Visit)     
       Pre-adoptive 233.97 62.01 3.77 146.73 63.80 2.30 
       Foster-relative  325.63 48.50 6.71 250.93 55.72 4.50 
       Foster-nonrelative 437.40 48.30 9.06 324.14 55.57 5.83 
       Group home 336.29 52.03 6.46 270.12 56.92 4.75 
       Institution 312.36 50.78 6.15 183.93 56.20 3.27 
       Ind. Living 214.10 80.16 3.92 203.38 74.17 2.74 
       Runaway 184.55 58.22 3.17 106.03 60.00 1.77 
Age (years) -9.91 .89 -11.09 -11.05 1.21 -9.23 
Num. of Placements 91.75 4.03 22.78 95.68 7.05 13.58 
Removal Reason (Ref=Other)     
       Physical Abuse -8.67 4.03 22.78 1.74 19.98 .09 
       Neglect 17.74 10.45 1.70 30.54     13.28 2.30 
       Sexual Abuse 31.70 23.18 1.37 54.38 19.10 2.85 
Private Foster Care 202.29 7.07 28.61 273.92 95.18 2.88 
# Placement*Private FC -31.92 1.66 -19.17 -29.53 9.93 -2.97 
Disability*Age -7.69 1.91 -4.02 - - - 
Model Fit AIC BIC ICC AIC BIC ICC 
 655136.5 655191.2 .1920 650555.3 650555.6 .1509 
Significance denoted by bold 
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main effect. The interaction between age at placement and disability indicates that the trend 
toward shorter stays for older youth is stronger for those with disabilities. The only association 
between race and time to permanency in the 2-level county model was for multiracial youth 
compared to youth recorded as “unknown (b=-53.10, t=-3.17, p<.0001).  Unknown was selected 
as the reference group for all subsequent models. 
 For the 2-level State model, gender (b=-12.32, t=-2.95, p=.0031; male compared to 
female), having a diagnosed disability (b=67.72, t=2.84, p=.0045), age (b=-11.36, t=-10.76, 
p<.0001), and number of placements (b=95.68, t=13.58, p<.0001) are all significantly associated 
with the time to permanency. In addition to the change to significance for gender, the magnitude 
of association of disability with time to permanence decreases by about half in the state model 
compared to the county. In addition, in this model a significant relationship was found between 
two of the three removal reasons and time to permanency: neglect (b=30.54, t=13.28, p=.028) 
and sex abuse (b=54.38, t=2.85, p=.004) were significant while physical abuse (b=1.74, t=.09, 
p=.93) was not significantly associated with time to permanency when compared to youth who 
entered for non-maltreatment reasons. The relationship between private foster care case 
management and time to permanency is similarly strong in terms of days in care but weaker in 
regard to statistical significance (b=273.92, t=2.88, p=.028) suggesting greater variance. Youth 
served by private foster care case managers take almost 274 days longer to achieve permanency 
in comparison to youth served by public foster care case managers. 
The 3-level nested model is very similar to the state model, gender (b=-12.34, t=-3.16, 
p<.0001), presence of a diagnosed disability (b=59.62, t=2.78, p<.0001), age (b=-11.15, t=-
14.79, p<.0001), and number of placements (b=95.17, t=12.34, p<.0001) are all significant. The 
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Table 12: 3 Level Multi-Level Models with Time to Permanency as Outcome (8 State Sample) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 3 Level (Counties in States) Model  
Fixed Effects b SE t ratio  
Time to Permanency 
(Intercept) 
10.51 81.90 .13  
Gender -12.34 3.91 -3.16  
Race (Ref=Unknown)     
      White 35.77 16.96 2.11  
      African-American 66.46 17.01 3.91  
      Asian 75.78 45.72 1.66  
      Hawaiian/PI -55.45 68.71 -.81  
      Am. Indian/AK  9.91 23.17 .43  
      Multiracial 64.91 20.62 3.15  
Hispanic 8.39 9.11 .92  
Mental Health DX -7.04 20.90 -.34  
Diagnosed Disability 59.62 21.41 2.78  
Other Medical DX 20.28 13.47 1.50  
Placement Type (Ref=Trial Home Visit)   
       Pre-adoptive 163.39 65.89 2.48  
       Foster-relative  265.37 57.12 4.65  
       Foster-nonrelative 349.84 56.98 6.14  
       Group home 272.93 58.60 4.66  
       Institution 198.42 57.94 3.42  
       Ind. Living 218.71 75.69 2.89  
       Runaway 124.27 61.62 2.02  
Age (years) -11.15 .75 -14.79  
Num. of Placements 95.17 7.71 12.34  
Removal Reason (Ref=Other)    
       Physical Abuse -1.65 18.14 -.09  
       Neglect 29.94 13.85 2.16  
       Sexual Abuse 54.05 20.61 2.62  
Private Foster Care 265.47 98.59 2.69  
Placement*Private FC -29.50 10.45 -2.82  
Model Fit AIC BIC ICC  
 649494.6 649498.8 .1688 (2 Level) 
.0258 (3 Level) 
Significance denoted by bold    
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similarity is also evident in the very small movement of the AIC and BIC model fit between the 
two-level and the three level models. For every additional placement, youth take an additional 95 
days to achieve permanency. Similarly, if a youth has a diagnosed disability, it takes 59.6 days 
longer to achieve permanency. With regards to age, for every additional year in age, the time to 
achieve permanency decreases by 11 days. Additionally, the relationship between neglect as the 
removal reason (b=29.94, t=2.16, p<.01) and sex abuse as the removal reason (b=54.05, t=2.62, 
p<.01) with time to permanency is statistically significant. Finally, youth receiving services from 
private foster care case managers remain in care 265 days longer than youth served by public 
foster care case managers (b=265.47, t=2.69, p=.0071). 
 There were two goodness of fit measures evaluated for these models: the Akaike 
information criterion (AIC) and the Bayesian information criterion (BIC). In general, smaller 
AIC’s and BIC’s are better so comparing these indices within models is a method of determining 
whether the model-build process has been successful. Table 13 has the AIC and BIC goodness of 
fit values for each of the models for Time to Permanency, demonstrating that the model build 
process was successful and improved the fit of the models. On the other hand, only the 
comparison to the fit of the null model showed a practically large improvement. There were very 
small differences between the two-level models and the two and three level models.  
The other measure of fit is the Intraclass Correlation Coefficient (ICC) which indicates the 
amount of variance in the dependent variable is accounted for by the random effect. The ICCs 
were calculated for each model based off the Null model, as recommended by Luke (2004) and 
Bell et al (2013). The ICCs indicate that 17% of the variation in time to permanency is accounted 
for by the county in the 2-level county model and 13.9% of the variance in time to permanency is 
accounted for by the state in the 2-level state model. This suggests that there is more variation by 
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county than by state. In the 3-level nested model, only 2% of the variance in time to permanency 
is accounted for by the state and 8% is accounted for by the county nested within the state. While 
this demonstrates that the county is more impactful when considering variation in time to  
Table 13: Fit Statistics of Time to Permanency Multi-level Models (8 State Model) 
 Time to Permanency State 2-Level Models 
 Model 1 
Null Model 
Used to 
calculate ICCs 
Model 2 
Level 1 Fixed 
Effects 
Model 3 
(Model 2 + 
random slopes for 
level 1 predictors) 
Model 4 
(Model 3 + level 
2 fixed effects) 
Final Model 
(Model 4 + 
Interactions) 
AIC 801452.2 654592.6 650562.9 650559.3 650555.3 
BIC 801452.5 654644.6 650566.0 650562.4 650558.6 
 Time to Permanency County 2-Level Models 
AIC 803671.3 658807.9 655931.7 655503.9 655136.5 
BIC 803675.4 658843.5 655983.7 655558.6 655191.2 
 Time to Permanency 3-Level Models  
AIC 800519.7 654100.3 649501.1 649497.9 649494.6 
BIC 800520.0 654102.5 649505.2 649502.0 649498.8 
 
permanency for youth in foster care, the ICCs are low and suggest that the county and state do 
not account for a practically significant amount of variance in the time to permanency. 
4.2.2 AIM 1: Exit Type  
Multinomial logistic mixed models were run in PROC GLIMMIX. The collapsed 
variable has four levels: 0=No exit, 1=reunification, 2=Living with a relative/Guardianship, 
3=Adoption, and 4=All Other exit types. The same model build approach was taken as for the 
time to permanency models outlined in Table 4. The 3-level model was over-specified and is not 
reported here. Privatization of foster care case management was significantly associated with exit 
type in the 2-level county model (b=-.08, t=-3.07, p<.0001, OR.92) but is not significantly 
associated with exit type in the 2-level state model (b=.22, t=.31, p=.75, OR=1.2). Every 
placement type, except for runaway vs. trial home visit, are significantly associated with exit 
type in both 2-Level county models: Pre-adoptive (b=-1.93, t=-19.20, p<.0001, OR=10.9),  
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Table 14:  AIM 1: Converging Multi-level Models of Exit Type (8 State Sample) 
 2 Level (County) Model 2 Level (State) Model 
Fixed Effects b SE t (OR) b SE t (OR) 
Intercept       
   No Exit vs. Other -.38 .27 -1.38 -.75 .50 -1.51 
   Reunification vs. Other 1.22 .27 4.49 1.27 .50 2.54 
   Guardianship vs. Other 2.10 .27 7.71 2.25 .50 4.51 
   Adoption vs. Other 2.99 .27 10.94 3.20 .50 6.40 
Gender -.01 .02 -.35(.99) -.001 .02 -.07(.99) 
Race (Ref=Unknown)     
      White .15 .06 2.57(1.2) .27 .06 4.32(1.3) 
      African-American -.05 .06 -.76(.96) .14 .06 2.18(1.2) 
      Asian -.20 .15 -1.37(.82) -.22 .16 -1.38(.81) 
      Hawaiian/PI .15 .35 .42(1.2) .13 .39 .34(1.1) 
      Am. Indian/AK  1.11 .14 8.08(3.0) .98 .16 6.20(2.7) 
      Multiracial .18 .08 2.23(1.2) .21 .08 2.54(1.2) 
Hispanic .04 .04 1.00(1.0) -.08 .04 -2.23(.92) 
Mental Health DX .21 .07 2.88(1.2) .22 .08 2.96(1.3) 
Diagnosed Disability -.45 .07 -6.40(.63) -.48 .07 -6.37(.62) 
Other Medical DX .65 .07 9.16(1.9) .52 .07 6.95(1.7) 
Placement Type (Ref=Trial Home Visit)    
       Pre-adoptive  -1.93 .10 -19.20(10.9) -2.04 .11 -17.90(12.3) 
       Foster-relative  .45 .03 13.39(9.7) .47 .04 11.60(11.1) 
       Foster-nonrelative .34 .03 10.58(19.0) .36 .04 9.24(19.1) 
       Group home 1.01 .06 17.54(7.6) .91 .06 14.77(10.8) 
       Institution .10 .05 2.17(4.0) .34 .05 6.50(4.5) 
       Ind. Living -.54 .23 -2.32(7.5) -.53 .22 -2.39(9.0) 
       Runaway .08 .11 .74(6.9) .16 .11 1.38(7.7) 
Age (years) -.02 .002 -10.77(.97) -.03 .002 -16.28(.97) 
Num. of Placements .07 .004 15.13(1.1) .04 .004 8.84(1.0) 
Days in FC Spell .0001 0 Inf.(.99) .0004 0 Inf.(1.0) 
Removal Reason (Ref=Other)    
       Physical Abuse .02 .03 .64(1.0) .21 .03 7.35(1.2) 
       Neglect -.24 .02 -11.41(.79) .03 .02 1.07(1.0) 
       Sexual Abuse -.02 .05 -.42(.98) .01 .05 .15(1.0) 
Private Foster Care -.08 .03 -3.07(.92) .22 .70 .31(1.2) 
Model Fit AIC BIC VPC AIC BIC VPC 
 90753 90794 .8052 81082.18 81084.
56 
.2647 
Significance denoted by bold      
62 
 
Relative Foster (b=.45, t=13.39, p<.0001, OR=9.7), Non-Relative Foster (b=.34, t=10.58, 
p<.0001, OR=19.00), Group home (b=1.01, t=17.54, p<.0001, OR=7.6), Institution (b=.10, 
t=2.17, p<.0001, OR=4.0), Independent Living (b=-.54, t=-2.32, p<.0001, OR=7.5); and 2-Level 
State models: Pre-adoptive (b=-2.04, t=-17.90, p<.0001, OR=12.3), Relative foster (b=.47, 
t=11.60, p<.0001, OR=11.1), Non-Relative Foster (b=.36, t=9.24, p<.0001, OR=19.1), Group 
home (b=.91, t=14.77, p<.0001, OR=10.8), Institution (b=.34, t=.6.50, p<.0001, OR=4.5), 
Independent Living (b=-.53, t=-2.39, p<.0001, OR=9.0). 
4.2.3 AIM 1: Re-entry  
The final series of models for the 8-state sample used Re-entry as the dependent variable. 
Re-entry into foster care after exit from the prior spell in care was coded as a dummy variable 
(yes or no). Binomial logistic mixed models were run in PROC GLIMMIX, again following the 
guidelines of Kiernan, Tao, and Gibbs (2012), but the three-level model did not converge. This is 
most likely due to over-specification and to the rarity of re-entry with only 13% (n=6973) of the 
sample re-entering care during the study period.  
Table 15 shows the results of the models that did converge. Receipt of private foster care 
case management services decreased likelihood of “no” re-entry for the 2-level county model 
(b=-.08, t=-3.07, p=.0007, OR=.92). However private foster care case management is not 
significantly associated with re-entry in the 2-level state model (b=-.01, t=-.02, p=.98, OR=.99)  
In both models, sexual abuse as the removal reason was associated with an increased likelihood 
of no re-entry (2-level county: b=.13, t=2.86, p<.0001, OR=1.26; 2-level state: b=.21, t=2.64, 
p<.0001, OR=1.24) as was age (2-level county: b=.03, t=10.16, p<.0001, OR=1.03; 2-level state: 
b=.03, t=10.24,  p<.0001, OR=1.03), and number of placements (2-level county: b=-.04, t=-
10.18, p<.0001, OR=.96; 2-level state: b=-.03, t=-8.28, p<.0001, OR=.97) and being of Hispanic  
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Table 15: AIM 1: Converging Multi-level Models of Re-Entry to Foster Care (8 State Sample) 
 2 Level (County) Model 2 Level (State) Model 
Fixed Effects b SE t(OR) b SE t(OR) 
Re-entry: no (Intercept) 1.33 .14 9.67 1.36 .24 5.74 
Gender -.001 .03 -.03(.99) -.006 .03 -.22(.99) 
Race (Ref=Unknown)     
      White -.23 .09 -2.47(.79) -.24 .10 -2.51(.79) 
      African-American -.10 .10 -.99(.91) -.12 .10 -1.25(.88) 
      Asian -.06 .25 -.22(.95) -.06 .25 -.22(.95) 
      Hawaiian -.27 .49 -.55(.76) -.27 .49 -.55(.76) 
      Am. Indian/AK  -.49 .16 -3.14(.61) -.46 .16 -2.94(.63) 
      Multiracial -.43 .12 -3.63(.65) -.38 .12 -3.18(.68) 
Hispanic .15 .05 2.78(1.16) .24 .05 4.37(1.27) 
Mental Health DX -.18 .10 -1.74(.83) -.23 .10 -2.17(.80) 
Diagnosed Disability .09 .11 .89(1.10) .09 .11 .83(1.09) 
Other Medical DX -.01 .10 -.14(.99) .03 .10 .32(1.03) 
Placement Type (Ref=Trial Home Visit)    
       Pre-adoptive 2.41 .32 7.64(.17) 2.40 .30 .81(.204) 
       Foster-relative  .66 .05 13.58(.19) .81 .05 15.25(.207) 
       Foster nonrelative .72 .05 15.36(.15) .83 .05 15.97(.169) 
       Group home .53 .08 7.05(.16) .62 .08 8.17(.164) 
       Institution .54 .07 7.98(.85) .59 .07 8.33(.851) 
       Ind. Living 2.24 .72 3.11(.23) 2.24         .70 3.19(.223) 
       Runaway .93 .18 5.25(.09) .90 .17 5.24(.090) 
Age (years) .03 .002 10.16(1.03) .03 .003 10.24(1.03) 
Num. of Placements -.04 .004 -10.18(.96) -.03 .004 -8.28(.97) 
Days in FC Spell -.001 0 Inf(1.00) 3.7E-6 0 Inf.(1.0) 
Removal Reason (Ref=Other)     
       Physical Abuse .14 .04 3.68(1.16) .07 .04 1.73(1.07) 
       Neglect .12 .03 3.96(1.13) -.04 .03 -1.27(.96) 
       Sexual Abuse .23 .08 2.86(1.26) .21 .08 2.64(1.24) 
Private Foster Care -.13 .04 -3.40(.880) -.01 .29 -.02(.99) 
Model Fit AIC BIC VPC AIC BIC VPC 
 33488 33525 .0502 33213 33215 .0347 
Significance denoted by bold
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origin (2-level county: b=.15, t=2.78, p<.0001, OR=1.16; 2-level state: b=.24, t=4.37, p<.0001, 
OR=1.27). 
The binary logistic multi-level models with re-entry as the dependent variable used three 
measures of goodness of fit. Similar to the linear multi-level models, the AIC and BIC are 
measures of goodness of fit that are used to compare models with the smaller the value indicating 
the better fit. In contrast to the linear multi-level models, in the binary logistic multi-level 
models, the Variance Partition Coefficient (VPC) is used to assess the amount of variance in the 
dependent variable that is accounted for by the random effect (county or state in these models). 
In binary models, the VPC is calculated as:  !"!"#$"%   (Goldstein, Browne, and Rasbash, 2002; 
Austin and Merlo, 2017). The re-entry models both have very small VPC’s (2-level County 
VPC=.03, 2-Level State VPC=.05) indicating that there is very little variance in re-entry of youth 
in foster care that is accounted for by the 2nd level variable (state or county respectively). Once 
again, the three-level model did not converge. 
4.2.4 AIM 2   
Similar to AIM 1, all analyses were run in SAS VS 9.4. Difference in Difference models 
were run using PROC REG to examine differences in rates of exit before and after privatization 
compared to a control (Iowa). Difference-in-Difference analysis requires the use of linear 
regression even when using a categorical dependent variable (Warton, Parker, & Karter, 2017). 
The means of each outcome of interest were graphed by state across the study period to track any 
change in the trajectory in the rate of exit to adoption and/or the rate of exit to reunification in 
Iowa and Nebraska (see Figures 1 and 2). As can be seen in both figures (note that the scale is 
changed for ease of display in Figure 2) there are very small practical variations in exit to 
reunification or adoption between states during the observation period. 
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Figure 1:  Iowa and Nebraska Sample Exit to Reunification 2007-2014 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Iowa and Nebraska Sample Exit to Adoption 2007-2014 
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Despite the small visually evident differences, difference-in-differences ordinary least 
squares regressions were still run for three different outcomes:  exit to adoption dummy variable, 
exit to reunification dummy variable, and exit vs. no exit. The exit vs. no exit model was further 
tested to see if differences exist when stratified by case goal (e.g. case goal is adoption or 
reunification).  
Nebraska privatized foster care case management (and all public child welfare services) 
in October of 2010. By the end of fiscal year 2012, all of Nebraska’s child welfare system had 
reverted back to public control. Therefore, two separate difference-in-differences analyses were 
run for each model, one with privatization as the ‘treatment’ period and a second for the entire 
timeframe (2009-2014). All analyses were run in SAS using PROC REG.  
The assumptions of a difference-in-difference analysis must be met in order for the 
analysis to be valid (Abadie, 2005). Specifically, the two groups, Iowa and Nebraska in this 
study, must have parallel trends prior to the treatment (privatization) period. Figures 1 and 2 
show the trajectory of exit to adoption and reunification over the study period for the state of 
Nebraska and the state of Iowa. It appears that there are violations to the assumption of parallel 
trends.  
Table 16 displays the final results for all models where the privatization period is the 
‘treatment period’ from 2011-2012. Table 17 has the full results for all models for the full 
timeframe. While the models converged, there was no consistent significance across time periods 
and the state level variables. Further some models were not significant. 
It may be that despite no evident explanation for other efforts within the states that would 
confound the results, the violations simply do not allow for the analyses to be valid. It should be 
noted again, however, that the plots themselves suggested little practical variation. 
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Table 16: Iowa vs. Nebraska Regression Output:  Public Time 1 (2009-2010) vs. Private (2011-2012) 
 Model 1: Exit to 
Adoption 
Model 2: Exit to 
reunification 
Model 3: Exit vs. 
No Exit 
Model 4: Exit w/ 
case goal 
adoption 
Model 5: Exit w/ 
case goal 
reunification 
 b (95% CI) b (95% CI) b (95% CI) b (95% CI) b (95% CI) 
Intercept .011(.011,.012) .039(.039,.040) .951(.950,.952) .591(.579,.603) .518(.511,.524) 
2010 .012(.011,.012) .027(.025,.028) -.093(-.095,-.091) -.100(-.116,-.084) -.012(-.021,-.004) 
2011 .007(.006,.009) .006(.004,.008) -.054(-.057,-.051) .008(-.014,.031) -.059(-.071(-.048) 
2012 .010(.009,.011) .024(.022,.026) -.147(-.150,-.144) -.133(-.153,-.113) -.135(-.145,-.124) 
State -.003(-.004,-.002) .001(.000,.003) -.001(-.002,.001) -.021(-.040,-.002) -.014(-.024,-.005) 
2011*State -.003(-.005,-.001) .001(-.002,.004) -.016(-.020,-.012) -.039(-.073,-.006) -.021(-.037,-.006) 
2012*State -.004(-.006,-.002) -.000(-.003,.003) -.001(-.011,-.003) -.026(-.060,.007) -.007(-.022,.008) 
Model Statistics 
F (R2) 563.45(.005) 757(.006) 11890.5(.092) 179.84(.044) 518.65(.036) 
Significance denoted in bold 
 
 
Table 17: Iowa vs. Nebraska Regression Output: Private (2011-2012) vs. Public Time 2 (2013-2014) 
 Model 1: Exit to 
Adoption 
Model 2: Exit to 
reunification 
Model 3: Exit vs. 
No Exit 
Model 4: Exit w/ 
case goal adoption 
Model 5: Exit w/ 
case goal 
reunification 
 b (95% CI) b (95% CI) b (95% CI) b (95% CI) b (95% CI) 
Intercept .013(.012,.013) .039(.038,.040) .980(.979,.981) .655(.643,.667) .623(.616,.630) 
2010 .011(.010,.012) .027(.025,.028) -.109(-.111,-.107) -.135(-.151,-.119) -.059(-.067,-.051) 
2011 .007(.006,.008) .009(.006,.011) -.074(-.077,-.071) -.064(-.087,-.042) -.100(-.111,-.088) 
2012 .010(.009,.011) .010(.008,.012) -.082(-.086,-.079) .017(-.007,.042) -.094(-.106,-.082) 
2013 .004(.003,.005) .028(.025,.030) -.072(-.075,-.069) -.039(-.068,-.011) -.000(-.013,.012) 
2014 -.010(-.011,-.009) -.014(-.016,-.012) -.108(-.110,-.105) -.305(-.333,-.277) -.287(-.299,-.276) 
State -.004(-.004,-.003) .003(.002,.004) -.002(-.004,.000) -.042(-.061,-.023) -.030(-.040,-.020) 
2011*State -.002(-.004,-.001) -.001(-.004,.002) -.011(-.015,-.007) .004(-.030,.037) -.011(-.026,.004) 
2012*State -.005(-.007,-.003) .006(.002,.010) .004(-.001,.008) -.034(-.077,.008) .033(.015,.051) 
2013*State .002(.000,.004) -.009(-.012,-.005) -.005(-.010,.000) .028(-.017,.074) -.041(-.060,-.023) 
2014*State .001(-.001,.003) -.004(-.007,-.001) -.004(-.008,.001) .033(-.009,.075) .049(.032,.066) 
Model Statistics 
F(R2) 381.45(.005) 533.35(.008) 10160.4(.126) 256.03(.099) 907.27(.098) 
Significance denoted in bold 
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Chapter 5: Discussion 
The results show that privatization of foster care case management, at least in the AIM 1 
multi-state comparison, does impact permanency outcomes of youth in foster care. The variation 
in time was impressive but the expected additional variance by county or state was minimal. The 
ICCs, were low, suggesting that the amount of variance accounted for by the second level (and 
third level for the 3-level model) variables is minimal. Consequently, the increase in time in care 
(244.80 days in the 2-level county model, 252.11 days in the 2-level state model, and 263.32 
days in the 3-level model) does not vary by state or county.  While this is not consistent with 
Courtney & Hook (2012) or Becker and colleagues (2007), the states included in the present 
study were different and the regions within states were counties rather than court jurisdictions.  
Further the prior studies generally sampled earlier years, varied in the length of follow-up and 
had somewhat different control variables. The remaining discussion focuses first on permanency, 
then on stability following exit and finally on the lack of difference in difference findings. 
5.1 Time to Exit and Exit Type 
Although there is little literature on permanency outcomes with which to compare 
findings regarding the impact of privatization, the increased length of stay and lower likelihood 
of positive exit are consistent with the more established cost analyses that suggest that 
privatization does not typically lead to cost savings (Freundlich, & Gerstenzang, 2003a). In other 
words, while private agencies may “win” contracts based on projected costs per child, the actual 
costs will increase based on days in care. Further a focus on rapid exits may lead to less child-
centered outcomes (McBeath and Meezan, 2009), this may lead to less desirable outcomes for 
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those who do exit. Notably, however, while the effect on length of stay was practically large, the 
effect size for privatization on exit type was very modest. 
 Race/ethnic categories were rarely statistically significant and never practically large. 
This is interesting given literature that suggests that African American children tend to spend 
longer in care (Becker, Jordan & Larsen, 2007; Courtney & Hook, 2012; Shaw, 2010). This 
varies in conclusion from a recent unpublished doctoral dissertation that conducted a similar 
analysis using fewer and different states which implemented PBC with an intent to reduce time 
to exit (Menozzi, 2016). On the other hand, the Menozzi study also focuses on early adopters of 
privatization that submitted complete data to AFCARS in the mid-1990s and collapses race into 
white, black or other. AFSA (1997) significantly altered permanency timelines but state 
implementation of federal policy is often delayed. It seems likely that states included might still 
be reacting to AFSA during the early years of the follow-up period. It is also unclear how 
collapsing race and age in that study may have inflated differences or obscured other trends.  
Findings regarding placement type being important in relation to time in care is more 
consistent with prior work (e.g., Courtney & Hook, 2012). However, the practical significance of 
factors like relative care was actually limited to how this compared to the reference group, which 
was pre-adoptive placement. Placement with relatives was actually associated with a slightly 
lower length of stay in regard to the magnitude of effect than placement in non-relative care 
(refer back to Tables 10 & 11). In most studies of placement type and exit from care, relative 
care (or kinship care) is associated with an increased length of stay (Courtney, 1994; O-Brien, 
2012). It may be that increased emphasis on permanence and termination of parental rights has 
led to greater numbers of exits to some form of permanent relative care or guardianship. 
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Of course, time in care is not always a marker for positive outcomes. As stated in the 
introduction, policy prioritizes certain outcomes as positive such as reunification, adoption and 
some form of relative care (Carnochan et al., 2013). Ideally, stays in care are both as short as 
possible and result in the most positive exit to a permanent home. A few findings crosscut both 
metrics.  
The findings regarding having a disability and spending more time in care as well as 
being less likely to exit in a positive manner were not unexpected based on prior research (e.g., 
Akin, 2011; Courtney & Hook, 2012). Indeed, the adoption auction posited by Blackstone and 
Hakim (2003) stems from the recognition that children that are more difficult to care for may be 
less desirable to take on in regard to a permanent placement without ongoing formal supports. 
This finding also appears to extend beyond the US system (Welch, Stalker, Jones & Stewart, 
2015). It is perhaps not surprising that this factors in as a strong independent predictor regardless 
of privatization. It is less clear why a child with a mental health or physical health condition did 
not face similar barriers to positive exits- although prior findings related to mental health have 
varied by type of exit (e.g., Courtney & Hook, 2012).  Physical health, per se, has not been as 
commonly studied. It is not possible to assess the level of impairment associated with these 
categories which may have had some effect. It is also possible that there are greater supports 
available for children with these issues as compared to those with a diagnosed disability.  
Regardless of privatization, children of special needs appear to require additional resources in 
order to achieve equal likelihood of permanency.  
While race was not a significant predictor of time in care, there was a small significant 
effect for White children compared to those categorized as “other” and a strong positive effect 
for American Indian/Alaskan Native (AI/AN) children related to increased likelihood of a 
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positive exit type. It may be that the latter finding is a hopeful sign in regard to the impact of 
special heightened attention to both removal and permanency for AI/AN children related to the 
Indian Child Welfare Act (Fletcher, Singel and Fort, 2009). On the other hand, cross-reporting of 
data from tribal child welfare organizations to the state systems is not consistent (Fox, 2003). It 
is not known, therefore if there is something unique about the group of AI/AN children that is 
represented in the federal data. 
Finally, the bulk of the focus on child welfare outcomes for youth in foster care has been 
on children entering care for reasons of maltreatment (Shaw, Bright & Sharpe, 2015). In the 
present study, children who were placed in care for reasons of maltreatment stayed somewhat 
longer than those placed for other reasons. This appears to contrast somewhat with Courtney & 
Hook (2012) though it is not clear that their sample included the full range of other reasons for 
entry.  
Children placed for reasons of neglect were less likely to exit to a positive outcome. Prior 
studies have found similar results specific to certain exit types (Akin, 2011; Courtney & Hook, 
2012) but these were generally in comparison to other maltreatment types. Given the scant 
literature it is not clear why this result was obtained. It may be that relatives or other families are 
easier to find for children who enter for reasons of parental death or incarceration. For children 
who enter care through voluntary placement due to emotional or behavioral problems these 
children may exit more quickly to other systems or once they receive intervention may return 
home more easily. It is also possible that neglect is a proxy for greater materials needs that are 
more difficult to address (e.g., housing).  More work is needed to understand trajectories for 
these children.  
5.2 Re-entry 
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A final metric used in the present study was re-entry following an exit from care. 
Generally, re-entry is not uncommon, particularly when follow-up periods are longer (Lee, 
Jonson-Reid & Drake, 2012; Goering & Shaw, 2017). While the literature on foster care re-entry 
is not large, there is some consistency in studies finding greater stability in exit for children 
placed with relatives (Goering & Shaw, 2017) and higher risk of re-entry associated with shorter 
stays in care (Goering & Shaw, 2017; Jonson-Reid, 2003; Shaw, 2006). In the present study, 
youth served in privatized systems stayed longer in care but were also less likely to re-enter once 
exited. Without knowing what services were provided during foster placement, it is unclear if the 
increased time in care was actually a positive indicator of time spent stabilizing children 
according to their needs or responding to family needs required prior to reunification. AFCARS 
does not provide data on the family of origin in regard to the plans for reunification nor does it 
provide data on pre-adoptive services.  
 In regard to neglect, relatively few studies focused on foster care have looked at reason 
for entry by type of maltreatment as a predictor for outcomes. Studies of re-entry into care have 
found no effect or a similar effect regarding neglect but these did not include children placed for 
other reasons (Connell et al., 2009; Jonson-Reid et al, 2003). On the other hand, studies of 
neglected children generally find higher rates of recurrence (White, Hindley & Jones, 2015) and 
worse or equally poor developmental outcomes when compared to other forms of maltreatment 
(Gilbert et al., 2009). The fact that neglected children may also fair worse in certain metrics for 
foster care outcomes is additional cause for concern. 
5.3 AIM 2 Findings 
Similar to Menozzi (2016), this study also sought to look at a how variations in placement 
trends might be explained by onset of privatization, cessation and subsequent return to public child 
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welfare. While her study focused on four states during an earlier period in the privatization 
movement did find significant differences the present study did not find meaningful results. The 
plots of exits did not reveal practically significant differences between state trends, but neither 
were they parallel. The subsequent difference-in-difference models, while they successfully ran, 
did not result in models that were meaningful. This may be because the data failed meet the primary 
assumption of parallel trends prior to the treatment period (privatization). As detailed earlier, 
attempts were made to identify state specific variations in other policies that may have impacted 
foster care exit, but no sufficiently robust large-scale efforts were uncovered. It is possible that 
with propensity score matching or matching to a different state that these models will satisfy the 
assumptions of a difference-in difference analysis. It is also possible that because Nebraska was 
ultimately an example of a failed attempt that it was unrealistic to expect significant variation from 
a public system. 
5.4 Limitations 
There are two primary limitations of this study. The failure of the re-entry and exit type 
three-level models within AIM 1, 8-state models to converge uniformly and the poor ICCs (or 
VPCs for binary logistic models) indicate that these models may not be specified accurately. 
Kiernan, Tao, and Gibbs (2012) provided strategies for specifying models in PROC GLIMMIX 
for binomial outcome variables. These steps were taken but not all models converged given the 
memory space available in the computers used. Additional research is needed to determine how 
to resolve the over-specification issue with the 3-level multinomial and binomial models. 
Secondly, there are substantial limitations in the data captured by AFCARS.  First, 
AFCARS does not have organizational level data to confirm that youth were served by private 
agencies. Inclusion criteria for states was established to account for the lack of organizational 
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data. States were only selected for inclusion as “private” if at least 75% of the foster care 
population were served by private foster care case managers. However, at least 25% of the foster 
care population in those states could be served by public agencies and there is no way to identify 
which individuals that is. It is possible that there are systematic differences within a state as to 
who is served by a private foster care agency and who is served by a public foster care agency. 
This risk is lessened by the fact that of the four states included as “private” Illinois, Kansas, and 
Nebraska were 100% private during the study period. The structure of contracts with private 
agencies vary, and as established through the experiences of Kansas and Nebraska, not all private 
agencies are prepared to undertake the financial burdens that accompany foster care case 
management (Ensign & Metzenthin, 2007; Hubel et al, 2013).  
Organizational level data would be helpful to determine if there are organizational 
differences between permanency outcomes for youth served by agency or consortium. This data 
could include information about the contract, including targeted and incentivized outcomes for 
youth and families served, as well as information about staff such as training, turnover, and 
supervision that might inform permanency outcomes for youth in foster care. The results of this 
study call for further exploration of the impact of privatization of child welfare services on youth 
and families. 
This study solely focused on privatization of foster care case management and did not 
explore the impact of privatization of any other services. As shown in Table 1, many states have 
contracted with private agencies for some child welfare services. Research is needed to 
determine whether these services are achieving the stated goals of meeting outcomes for youth 
and families.  
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AFCARS data also lacks information on caregiver and family risks that have been named 
in prior research as factors associated with permanency outcomes (Kimberlin et al., 2009). Exits 
from care similar to other child welfare service outcomes are often dependent on resources and 
services provided by other systems (Jonson-Reid et al., 2017). AFCARS lacks data on family 
level variables that may inform reunification plans. It also lacks data on what services were 
accessed to address a child’s needs that may help to prepare them for a return home or other 
positive exit. While the National Study of Child and Adolescent Well-being offers a greater 
window on risk and protective factors, it too lacks the type of details on services utilization that 
would better help explain outcomes and the sample is likely too small to explore the various 
demographic and placement characteristics available in the present study. That being said, even 
the scale of the present study was insufficient to explore important but rare exit types such as 
child death.  
5.5 Implications for Policy 
 As recent as 2015, the State of Georgia contemplated privatizing all child welfare 
services. This effort failed but is not an anomaly as more states explore cost-cutting measures for 
child welfare services. While states such as Nebraska have had high-profile negative experiences 
with privatization of foster care services, there are other states such as Missouri, New York, and 
Wisconsin that have established privatized systems. This study contributes important information 
to the field about how privatization of foster care case management impacts permanency 
outcomes for youth in foster care. Specifically, this study demonstrates that youth served by 
private foster care case managers remain in care longer than youth served by public foster care 
case managers. This should be considered by policy-makers when considering any privatization 
efforts of foster care case management.  
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Further, as privatization efforts expand within child welfare services to other types of 
services (e.g. adoption services, family finding, residential services), consideration should be given 
to the evaluation and assessment of these services as well as the time necessary to transition from 
a public system to a private system. Private agencies in Kansas and Nebraska went bankrupt due 
to the financial burdens associated with assuming the costs of private foster care case management. 
The associated disruption of services to families that accompanies the bankruptcy of an agency 
must be guarded against. These are considerations that must be made by legislators contemplating 
expanded the privatization of child welfare. 
5.6 Implications for Research 
 There are a number of avenues for future research on privatization of child welfare 
services. This includes the impact that incentives built within performance-based contracts have 
on targeted outcomes, exploring the population of youth served by private agencies to determine 
if they differ substantially from youth served by public agencies in hybrid states, and exploring 
whether receiving services from different private agencies is driving outcomes. These questions 
were outside the scope of this study but are necessary to better understanding the full context of 
privatization of child welfare services and the associated impact on youth and family outcomes. 
 Another issue for further exploration is the county-level data within AFCARS. AFCARS 
does not report county for an individual if there are less than 1000 individuals in foster care in 
the county. This means that all youth served in these counties are aggregated into a common 
county. This necessarily impacts the specificity of county level analysis. Future research that is 
disaggregated by the county variable is called for to better assess if there are county level 
differences in outcomes for youth in foster care. 
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 Finally, this study has no information about service referral or completion by youth 
and/or families. Whether or not a youth (or their family of origin) completed services is a 
fundamental part of every case plan for a family involved in the child welfare system. Future 
study should include service information for youth to provide further context to a family’s 
experience with the child welfare system. 
5.7 Implications for Practice 
 The key takeaways for practitioners from this study is to be aware that there are 
differential permanency outcomes for youth served by private foster care case managers when 
compared to youth served by public foster care case managers. These differences do not vary by 
race/ethnicity or age, but presence of physical and mental health conditions is associated with 
increased time to permanency. It is well established that youth in foster care have higher rates of 
diagnosis for mental health issues when compared to the general population (Bronsard et al, 
2016, Clausen et al, 1998). Consequently, child welfare practitioners, and medical professionals 
working with youth in foster care, should screen for mental and physical health conditions. The 
move toward medical homes for youth in foster care are a promising practice (Jaudes et al, 2012) 
that should be explored further.  Finally, efforts targeting a reduction in the time required to 
achieve permanency is indicated, particularly for specific populations such as youth with a 
disability.  Federal policy, such as ASFA and Fostering Connections to Success, did target 
permanency timelines for youth in foster care, but there may be a need to examine how 
privatization efforts may require different strategies to attain quicker exits.  Future research 
should also explore whether or not all or a portion of this apparent increased time in care among 
privatized states relates to providing more extensive services that increase stability following 
exit.   
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5.8 Conclusion 
 This study sought to explore the relationship between privatization of foster care case 
management and permanency outcomes and stability for youth in foster care. Some of the 
findings appeared consistent with other studies of foster care outcomes not focused on 
privatization and some of the null findings in regard to cost savings. On the other hand, the 
present findings did vary from a prior study of time to permanence. Clearly more study is needed 
to understand how and for whom privatization effects child and family outcomes. Arguably, 
even if studies of cost savings were uniformly positive, there is a moral imperative to assure that 
child level outcomes are also positive for children that the state has assumed custody and 
therefore responsibility.  
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